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ABSTRACT

Architectural Level Risk Assessment

Ahmed E. Hassan

Many companies develop and maintain different types of large-scale software
systems for public and financial institutions. Should a failure occur in one of these
systems, the impact would be enormous. It is therefore essential, in maintaining a
system’s quality, to identify any defects early on in the development process in order to
prevent the occurrence of failures. However, testing all modules of large-scale systems to
identify defects can be very expensive. There is therefore a need for methodologies and
tools that support software engineers in identifying the defected and complex software
components early on in the development process. Accurate early estimates will help
reduce wasted resources associated with testing.
Risk assessment is an essential process for ensuring high quality software products.
By performing risk assessment during the early software development phases we can
identify complex and high risk software modules, thus enables us to enhance resource
allocation decisions.
To assess the risk of software systems early on in the software’s life cycle, we
propose an architectural level risk assessment methodology. It combines the probability
of software failures and the severity associated with these failures to estimate software
risk factors. As a result, remedial actions to control and improve the quality of the

software product can be taken. We use UML specifications of software systems, which
are available early on in the software life cycle to come up with the risk factors of
software architectural elements (components/connectors), the scenarios, the use cases and
systems. Based on this methodology we build a risk assessment model which will enable
us to identify complex and noncomplex software components. We will be able to
estimate programming and service effort, and estimate testing effort. This model will
enable us also to identify components with high risk factor which would require the
development of effective fault tolerant mechanisms.
To estimate the probability of software failure we introduced and developed
dynamic metrics which are used to measure dynamic complexity and dynamic coupling
for software architectural elements from UML static models.
To estimate severity of software failure we propose an architectural level severity
methodology early on in the software design phase based on UML artifacts. Also we
propose a validation process for both risk and severity methodologies. Finally we propose
to implement a prototype tool support for the automation of the risk assessment
methodology.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Background

This section introduces the research motivation and presents an overview of the
general problem area. It describes the significance of the research and gives an overview
of the research including the scope and limitations. Background information follows to
establish fundamental concepts.
1.1 Motivation

All software projects are exposed to some degree of risk. The process of
developing a software solution based on plans and schedules containing estimates,
assumptions and other uncertainties are a risky business. This risk arises from software
project [Heemstra, 2003], software process [Brockers, 1995] or software product
[Katerina, 2003]. The software product risk is the risk of failure of software product. Our
research focus in this dissertation is software product risk assessment.
Many critical systems rely for their correct operation on complicated software
systems [Knight, 2000]. The impact of failure of these systems is huge. It is therefore very
important to identify any defects in these software systems in advance to reduce the
occurrence of failures. However, testing all modules in these types of large-scale systems to
identify defects is very expensive.
Accurate early estimates can help reduce wasted resources associated with testing.
Elemam et al [Elemam, 1999f] suggests that most field faults in software are found in a
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small proportion of the software components. Also Fenton et al [Fenton, 1999f] found very
strong indications that a small number of software components contain most of the faults
discovered during the testing phase, and that a very small number of components contain
most of the faults discovered in operation. This means that if these faulty components can
be detected early on in the software life cycle development, rectifying actions can be taken.
If we can identify complex and critical software components in advance, we can focus on
the components that need intensive testing and hence detect defects more efficiently.
Risk assessment is an essential process in managing and controlling software
development process. Risk assessment at the early design phase of the software is more
feasible and more beneficial than assessment at later development phases. Architecture
level risk assessment can be used to guide software development, testing, and maintenance
process.
The risk assessment at the software design phase will allow for a wide range of
preventive/corrective actions to be taken with the least impact on budget and schedule. It
enables designers to backtrack and redesign components with high risk factor. It could
also be used for assigning technical staff to testing, and maintenance efforts. Rather than
inspecting all software components on an equal basis, focusing on high risk components
can improve the efficiency of inspection.
To estimate risk of a software system we have to find an estimate for the
probability of software failure and also an estimate for the severity of this failure
[NASA3, 2000]. Our work is motivated by systemizing the risk assessment process. In
doing so, we estimate the probability of software failure as a function of software
dynamic behavior and propose a systematic process for the severity of software failure.

2

1.2 Research Significance

We have developed a risk assessment methodology to assess the risk of software
systems based on measurable parameters that can be automatically collected and analyzed
in the early software design phase based on UML artifacts.
In summary our contributions include:
•

Introducing an architectural level risk assessment methodology.

•

Introducing and developing UML based dynamic metrics which can be used as a
measure for probability of software failure.

•

Introducing and developing an architectural level severity assessment technique
using classical hazard analysis methods and software UML models.

•

Developing a tool support for the automation of the risk methodology.

1.3 Dissertation Structure

Chapter 2 presents the research objective of this work. Chapter 3 contains a
literary survey of related work in areas of software metrics, hazard analysis, severity
analysis and risk assessment. Chapter 4 addresses the dynamic metrics based on UML
static models. Chapter 5 presents the risk assessment methodology and risk model for
component/connector, scenario and use case risk model. Chapter 6 describes the severity
assessment methodology, Chapter 7 presents case studies, Chapter 8 is the evaluation
criteria for the risk assessment model, Chapter 9 presents a prototype tool support, and.
conclusions and future work are presented in Chapter 10.
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1.4 Background

This section contains relevant background information to orient the reader,
provide a foundation of basic risk concepts, clarify the meaning of software risk
assessment, and define key terms used in this dissertation.

1.4.1 Risk assessment

NASA-STD-8719.13A standard [NASA2, 1997] defines risk as a combination of
two factors: probability of a malfunction (failure) and the consequence of that
malfunction (severity). Probability of failure depends on the probability of occurrence of
a fault combined with the likelihood of exercising that fault. This standard defines several
types of risks, for example, availability risk, acceptance risk, performance risk, cost risk,
schedule risk, and reliability based risk. Our interest is the reliability-based risk. The
reliability-based risk takes into account the probability that the software product will fail
in the operational environment and the adversity of that failure [Yacoub, 2003].
1.4.2 Unified Modeling Language (UML)

The Unified Modeling Language (UML) [OMG, 2000] is a widely accepted
standard notation for modeling software systems and its use is continuously growing. The
software development industry is embracing UML language for its various uses, starting
from requirement analysis, to define software system architecture and also in the
subsequent phases of software life cycle. UML provides a framework for decomposing
the problem of software design into smaller components that are related to one another.
Different UML diagrams are provided (in an integrated framework) to represent the
software model from different viewpoints. The UML language is supported by graphical
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representations (easy to use), that are not far from the classical diagrams used before
introducing UML (e.g., state diagrams, class diagrams, and sequence diagrams.
Software architecture is defined in terms of components and connectors in UML
models.
We will use the generic term component to refer to the unit of observation. This
may mean a procedure, a file, an object, a method and as elaborate as a package of
classes or procedures. The proposed methodology is applicable irrespective of the exact
definition of a component. Connectors can be as simple as procedure calls; they can also
be as elaborate as client-server protocols, links between distributed databases, or
middleware. The components are mapped to the various components of the UML
sequence diagrams and the connectors can be perceived as the medium through which the
message transfer takes place
Next section sheds lights on dynamic metrics captured from UML static
specifications.
1.4.3 Dynamic Metrics

Static analysis [Benlarbi, 1999] helps software designers in generating software
metrics such as class size, the size of the hierarchy and static complexity measures which
could help in estimating code level defects. The complex dynamic behavior of many
applications, especially real-time applications, motivates a shift in interest from
traditional static analysis to dynamic analysis. Dynamic analysis is performed to analyze
the behavior of objects as expected during run time. UML defines modeling
specifications that can be used to specify the dynamic aspects of the software
architecture, which is critical to all development phases. UML is a suitable candidate for
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the proposed dynamic metrics. These dynamic metrics could automatically capture the
dynamic (complexity, coupling) of software architecture element components/connectors
from the UML visual static model.
The value of software metrics stems from their association with measures of
important external attributes [Elemam, 1999f]. An external attribute is measured with
respect to how the product relates to its environment. Examples of external attributes are
testability, reliability and maintainability. Practitioners, whether they are developers,
managers, or quality assurance personnel, are concerned with the external attributes.
However, they cannot measure many of the external attributes directly until quite late in
the life cycle of a project or even a product itself. Therefore, they can use product metrics
as leading indicators of those external attributes that are important to them. For instance,
if we know that a certain coupling metric is a good leading indicator of maintainability,
as measured in terms of the effort to make a corrective change, then we can minimize
coupling during design because we know that in doing so, we are also increasing
maintainability. As explored in chapter 4 we propose dynamic metrics [Hassan, 2001]
based on UML for measuring dynamic complexity/coupling of software architectural
elements (i.e. component/connector). We relate these metrics to the probability of
component/connector failure [Yacoub, 1999].
1.4.4 Probability of Failure

As stated in section 1.4.1, risk is defined as combination of probability of a
malfunction (failure) and the consequence of that malfunction (severity).
During the early phases of the software life cycle, it is difficult to estimate the
probability of failure of software components; therefore we use quantitative factors such
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as complexity (for components) and coupling (for connectors), which have a major
impact on fault proneness according to [Elemam11, 1999]. We use dynamic metrics to
estimate the probability of fault manifesting into a failure. Dynamic metrics are used to
measure the dynamic behavior of the system in a given scenario based on the premise
that the active components/connectors are the source of failures [Yacoub3, 1999]. We use
dynamic metrics as indicators of the probability of failure of a software
component/connector.
1.4.5 Severity

Traditional software fault detection models do not take into account the fact that
the consequences of various software failures caused by faults can be very different
[Briand, 1993a]. Thus, they are of limited use in the allocation of resources to the
portions of a system with the greatest risk. Since software failures have different
consequences, any measure of software fault proneness must include the measurement of
the consequence of failure (severity) [El-Emam, 1999]. Traditional software fault
detection models have not considered the cost of failure [Lanubile, 1997], [Harrison,
1988], so they are inappropriate for measuring the true risk associated with failure. Since
software failures have different consequences, [Susan, 1988] any measure of software
reliability risk must include the measurement of the consequence of failure.
1.4.6 Hazard Analysis

Hazard analysis plays a key role in system safety approach. A hazard is “any real
or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel, or damage to,
or loss of, equipment or property, or damage to environment” [DoD, 1997]. Many
techniques are available to help identify and analyze hazards. The use of multiple hazard

7

analysis techniques is recommended because each has its own purpose, strengths and
weaknesses. Typically, each technique addresses certain aspects of safety; thus, one
technique alone is not sufficient to identify and analyze all hazards of a system
[Sammarco, 2003].
1.5 Definitions
Hazard: Existing or potential condition that can result in or contribute to, a mishap

[NASA2, 1997].
Mishap: An unplanned event or series of events that results in death, injury, occupational

illness, or damage to or loss of equipment, property, or damage to the environment; an
accident [NASA2, 1997].
Risk: As it applies to safety, exposure to the chance of injury or loss. It is a function of

the possible frequency of occurrence of the undesired event, of the potential severity of
resulting consequences, and of the uncertainties associated with the frequency and
severity [NASA2, 1997].
Software error: An incorrect step, process, or data definition; for example, an incorrect

instruction in a computer program.
Software failure: An event in which a system or system component does not perform a

required function within specified limits [Sammarco, 2004].
Software fault: A manifestation of an error in the software. If encountered, a failure

might result [Sammarco, 2004].
Software architecture: There is no standard, universally-accepted definition of the term,

“software architecture,” although there is no shortage of definitions, either [Bass, 2003].
The software architecture of a program or computing system is the structure or structures
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of the system, which comprise software elements, the externally visible properties of
those elements, and the relationships among them.
Severity: severity considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by

the degree of injury, property damage, or system damage that could ultimately occur
[MIL_STD, 1984].
Software metrics: metrics are means of measuring some aspect of software and, in most

organizations, it directly relates to quality [Zuse, 1998]. The IEEE definition is “metric”
is synonymous with a “software quality metric” and it defines a software quality metric
as a function with input and output. Software quality metrics have software data as inputs
and a single numeric value as output. The output is interpreted as the degree to which
software possesses a given attribute that affects its quality [IEEE, 1993].
Software process: Lonchamp [Lonchamp, 1993] defines a software process as “A set of

partially ordered process steps, with a set of related artifacts, human and computerized
resources, organizational structures and constraints, intended to produce and maintain
the requested software deliverables”.
1.6 Summary

We presented in this chapter an overview of the general problem area. It describes
the research significance and gives an overview of the research scope and the limitations.
Finally, relevant background information has been presented to provide a foundation of
basic risk assessment concepts, clarify commonly misunderstood relationships, and
introduce terminology, in order to provide a common understanding.
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Chapter 2
Research Objectives and Specific Aims

2.1 Overview

In order to improve and control the quality of the software during the software
development process, software engineers and managers need methodologies and tools to
support software design and decision-making. Early risk assessment based on UML
models is a helpful tool for managers as well as software engineers. It could be a very
effective method of improving the system quality and reducing testing costs.
Several methodologies for risk assessment have been developed, mostly based on
subjective views. These approaches of risk assessment are highly sensitive to the manager’s
perceptions and preferences, which are difficult to represent by an algorithm. Depending on
the decision-maker’s attitude towards risk, he or she can decide early with little
information, or can postpone the decision, thus gaining time to obtain more information,
but losing some control. Without a systematic way of assessing possible risk, it is difficult
to build a high quality cost-effective system [Boehm, 1997]. There is a need for a
methodology to transform risk assessment into a structured problem with systematic
solutions. Constructing a model to assess risk based on objectively measurable parameters
that can be automatically collected and analyzed in the early design phase is our focus in
this dissertation.
The traditional software fault detection models do not consider the fact that the
consequences of various software failures caused by faults will be very different [Briand,
1993a]. Thus, they are of limited use in the allocation of resources to the portions of a
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system with the greatest risk. Any measure of software risk must include the
measurement of the consequence of failure (severity) [El-Emam, 1999] [Susan, 1988].
We propose a methodology for estimating the consequence of software failure (severity)
early on in the software design phase based on UML artifacts.
2.2 Research Objective

Our objective is to develop risk assessment methodology based on measurable
parameters that could automatically be collected and analyzed in the early software
design phase based on UML artifacts. We have also developed a severity assessment
methodology based on UML models.
2.3 Specific Aims
¾ Introducing architectural level risk assessment methodology, we should be able to

transform risk assessment into a structured problem with systematic solutions.
¾ Introducing and developing dynamic metrics which are used to measure dynamic

complexity

and

dynamic

coupling

for

software

architectural

element

(component/connector) from UML static models.
¾ Introducing and developing architectural level severity assessment technique

based on UML models using classical hazard analysis methods.
¾ Building risk assessment model which will enable us to :
• Identify complex software components that need detailed inspection.
• Identify noncomplex software components that are likely to have a low risk

factor and therefore candidates for development without detailed inspection.
• Estimate programming and service effort, and estimate testing effort.
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• Identify components with high risk factor which would require the

development of effective fault tolerance mechanisms.
¾ Implementing a tool support for the automation of the proposed risk assessment

methodology.
¾ Validating the methodology. For validating the methodology, we will compare

our results of the dynamic metrics and the risk factor to the results obtained from
the simulation model developed in [Yacoub, 2002].
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Chapter 3
Related Work

This chapter discusses previous related work in software metrics, severity analysis
and risk assessment, critiques the limitations and inadequacies of this research. It draws
distinctions between prior work and the proposed research. We proceed as follows:
Software metrics review, severity analysis review and software risk assessment
review.
3.1 Software Metrics Review

Software metrics offer a means to understand the process and product of the
software [Zuse, 1998]. It is necessary for software quality control [Fenton, 1999b]. The
most significance benefit of software metrics is that they are designed to provide
information to support managerial decision making during the software lifecycle. In his
research, Shyam et al [Shyam, 1998] recommended that the use of various well-constructed
metrics could be a basis for software managerial decision-making and could provide insight
into the software design process. Fenton et al [Fenton, 1996] classify software metrics into
three classes; resource, process and product metrics. Process and product metrics can help
both managing activities, (such as costing, scheduling, controlling and staffing), and
engineering activities (such as analyzing, designing, coding, testing and documenting)
[Abreu, 1996].
For the purpose of this dissertation our focus is on software product metrics;
resource and process metrics are out of the scope of this work.
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3.1.1 Software Product Metrics

The field of software product metrics has been a major focus of software metrics
research [Mills, 1998]. Measuring software products could help in establishing control over
software development activities [Littlefair, 2001]. Software metrics research has revealed
that software product metrics can be the basis for software quality predictions, such as
whether a software module is fault-prone [Taghi, 1999]. Research has shown software
product metrics to be useful predictors of software faults [Oman, 1997]. Software product
metrics can quantify the size and complexity of software artifacts in many dimensions. It is
currently a major determinant of the cost and effort required to develop software product
[Mills, 1998]. Product metrics incorporated into software predictive models could give
advanced warning of potential risks [Fenton, 1999mm]. Software product metrics could be
used to measure software products such as source code or design documents. Because it is
simple and easy to automate, the number of lines of source code metrics is one of the
earliest software product metrics [Fenton, 1999]. Other examples of product metrics
include Halstead [Halstead] and McCabe’s Cyclomatic Complexity [McCabe, 1976]. Since
the early days of computer science, these traditional metrics are still in use. These
traditional metrics could be used to quantify the internal structure of procedural software
systems [Zuse, 1991]. However, the need to quantify the unique features of emerged
Object Oriented paradigm has given birth, in recent years, to new metric sets. Concepts of
Object Oriented (OO) design and development have become popular in today's software
development environment and this motivates the shift of interest from traditional software
metrics to OO metrics [Chidamber, 1994]. Object oriented development has proved its
value for those software systems that must be maintained and modified [Rosenberg, 1998].
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The idea behind the development of object oriented metrics is that they can offer early
predictors of software components that contain faults (found during testing or that result
in field failures) or that are costly to maintain [Benlarbi, 1999] [Briand, 1998]. This could
also let the organization to take mitigating actions early and consequently avoiding costly
rework.
3.1.2 Object Oriented Metrics

A considerable number of object-oriented metrics have been constructed in the past;
for example, Abreu et al proposed a set of metrics suitable for evaluating the use of main
abstractions of the Object Oriented paradigm such as inheritance, encapsulation,
information hiding [Abreu, 1994]. Benlarbi et al [Benlarbi, 1999] proposed a set of OO
measures to define and examine the quality impact of polymorphism on OO design. They
concluded that these measures are significant predictors of fault proneness. Briand et al
proposed a suite of measures to quantify class coupling during the design of object oriented
systems [Briand, 1997]. Their results show that some of these coupling measures may be
useful as quality indicators of the design of OO systems. Chidamber et al developed a new
suite of metrics for OO design [Chidamber, 1994]. Cartwright and Shepperd [Cartwright,
2000] described an empirical investigation into an object oriented (OO) system comprised
of 133,000 lines of C++. He proposed a prediction system for size and number of defects
based upon OO classes. To achieve more reliable testing Mei et al [Mei, 1999] proposed a
set of object oriented metrics that help in selecting effective testing techniques. Kamiva et
al [Kamiva, 1999] proposed a new method to estimate the fault proneness of the class in the
early design phase, using several complexity metrics for OO software. In this proposed
method, they introduced four checkpoints into the analysis / design / implementation phase,
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and estimated the fault prone classes using the applicable metrics at each checkpoint. Letha
et al [Letha, 2000] introduced a suite of OO metrics, which offer a more direct mapping
from the metric to its associated quality factor. Much research has also been done to assess
the design quality of OO software systems based on OO metrics [Hitz, 1996], [Briand,
1999b], [Simon, 1997]. Most of these studies did not focus exclusively on those metrics
that can be collected during the design stage, but were applied to the source code (language
oriented metrics). The information these metrics need cannot be obtained until the
algorithm and structure of the class are determined at the end of design the phase.
However, the estimation of the fault-proneness in the early design phase helps in allocating
effort for fixing the faults. In order to help assess quality of the software product early on
during the development process, we have to give particular emphasis to the measurement
of product design artifacts. Most of these studies have used static analysis of code and
design documents to quantify the internal software properties. To deal with software failure
we need to deal with dynamic behavior specification rather than static designs. Despite the
rich body of research and practice in developing OO metrics, there has been less emphasis
on dynamic metrics. Dynamic metrics are used to measure the dynamic behavior of a
system based on the premise that active components are sources of failures [Lake, 1994].
The complex dynamic behavior of many real-time applications [Selic, 94] motivates a shift
in interest from traditional static OO metrics to dynamics metrics.
3.1.3 Dynamic Metrics

Briand et al [Briand, 2000] indicated that measures of structural design properties,
such as coupling or complexity, are widely considered to be indicators of external quality
attributes, such as reliability. Dynamic metrics (complexity metrics and coupling metrics)
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are used to measure the dynamic behavior of a system based on the premise that active
components are sources of failures [Lake, 1994].
Dynamic complexity metrics

The study of software complexity metrics has long been practiced by scientists and
engineers. Several studies found a correlation between the number of faults and the
complexity of the system [Purao, 2003], [Elemam, 1999]. The OO metrics are either based
on the static view of the design; i.e., its class diagrams, or the source code of the classes.
The metrics are used to evaluate the complexity of the design structure and, hence, are
static metrics. Most of these complexity definitions deal with the program at rest. However,
the level of exposure of a module is a function of its execution environment. Hence,
dynamic complexity [22] evolved as a measure of complexity of the subset of code that is
actually executed. Dynamic complexity was discussed by Munson et al [Munson, 1996].
They emphasize that it is essential not only to consider complex modules but also how
frequently they are executed. They define execution profiles for modules that reflect what
percentage of time a module is executing, and thus derived functional complexity and
operational complexity as dynamic complexity metrics. Toshihiro et al [Toshihiro, 1999]
proposed a method to estimate the fault-proneness of the class in the early phase, using
complexity metrics for object-oriented software. Ammar et al [Ammar, 1997] used Colored
Petri Nets models to measure dynamic complexity of software systems using simulation
reports. Poel et al [Poel, 2000] proposed a measures for a specific aspect of the dynamic
behavior of objects i.e., life cycle complexity using the so-called distance-based approach.
In chapter 4 we extend the dynamic complexity metrics to measure the quality of object-
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oriented designs. Our approach is based on static analysis of UML statecharts that captures
the behavior of the UML model.
Dynamic Coupling Metrics

Several studies have identified clear empirical relationships between class-level
coupling and the fault-proneness of the classes. Measures of coupling have been shown to
be reasonably accurate indicators of external quality attributes [Harrison, 2000]. In his
research [Aaron, 1998] Aaron et al concluded that coupling metrics may be good predictors
for run-time failures of a software product. Elemam et al [El-emam, 2001b] performed a
validation study of object oriented design metrics. The objective of this validation was to
determine which of these metrics was associated with fault-proneness. They conclude that
many coupling measures are strongly associated with fault-proneness.
Coupling between components provides important information for identifying
possible sources of exporting errors and identifying tightly coupled components. Moser et
al [Moser,1997] introduced a model for measuring coupling and cohesion; this model is
defined at the class level, only it does not reflect the dynamic behavior of the object. Li
et al [Li, 1993] proposed the Message Passing Coupling (MPC) as a measure of coupling
between classes which is defined as the number of "send" statements that are passed from
one class to other classes. But counting the number of send statements does not reflect the
actual number (frequency) of execution of that send statement. All these coupling
measures are based on a static view of the software system. To be accurate and cost
effective, there is a need to measure the dynamic interaction between software
components early on in the software design phase.
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The problem of measuring dynamic interaction between objects is addressed in
[Poels, 2000]. The author proposed object-event association matrix to measure dynamic
behavior of objects. Arisholm [Arisholm, 2002] proposed dynamic coupling measures, and
described how dynamic coupling can be calculated by tracing the flow of messages
between objects at run-time. It is impossible to be applied early on in the design phase; it is
language and code based metrics. Lilli et al [Lilli, 2000] proposed a coupling metrics based
on UML models. These metrics do not consider the dynamic behavior of the system.
Aaron et al [Aaron, 1998] indicated that coupling metrics is a good predictor for run-time
failure of the software product. Dynamic coupling could therefore be a good indicator for
connector failure. Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 2000] defined dynamic coupling metrics based on
UML, the execution of UML simulation model. It is tedious and time consuming to build a
simulation model for the software system to measure coupling between components.
In the next chapter we explore the proposed architecture level dynamic coupling
metrics as measures of coupling between components. These dynamic metrics are
automatically extracted from UML visual static models.
3.2 Severity assessment review

Severity assessment is a procedure by which the severity of a software
architectural element (component/connector) is estimated and ranked according to the
consequences of failure. According to MIL_STD_1629A [Mil, 1986], severity considers
the worst case consequence of a failure, determined by the degree of injury, property
damage, system damage, and mission loss that could eventually occur.
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To study the severity of software failure, we propose the Architecture Level
Severity Analysis Methodology based on the UML model and hazard analysis
techniques.
In this section, we review the hazard analysis techniques used with the proposed
severity methodology, the suitability of UML as a foundation for severity assessment,
and the related work on severity analysis.
3.2.1 Hazard analysis techniques

Hazard analysis techniques have been widely used in the development and
deployment of safety critical systems that involve computer software [Francesmary 1997],
[Heimdahl, 1996], [Leveson 1991], [Lutz 1993], [Ratan 1996]. Originally, a hazard
analysis process is a systematic process for identifying, assessing and controlling hazards.
The objectives of using any software hazard analysis technique are to identify and correct
deficiencies and to provide information for the necessary safeguards. Software hazard
analyses are used to change the software architecture or design, and to identify those
portions of the software which require increased attention to quality. Software hazard
analysis should be performed within the context of the overall system design, for those
attributes of the system design that contribute to the system’s ability to perform the
assigned tasks.
Hazard analysis techniques such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
[Heimdahl 1996], Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [NASA], Failure Modes
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [NASA, 1995 ], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
[Allenby 2001], Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) [Allenby, 2001], Event Tree
Analysis (ETA) [NASA 1995], and Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) [Papadopoulos
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1999] have demonstrated their value in a variety of contexts over the years, and they are
still widely practiced by safety engineers.
HAZOP is a technique for identifying and analyzing the hazards and operation
concerns of a system. In [Zhu, 2002] Hong adapted HAZOP and used it for quality
modeling software process. McDermid and Pumfrey [McDermid, 1994] proposed a
HAZOP analysis for identifying the hazardous failure modes of structural software model.
In [Bishop, 2002], Bishop proposed a HAZOP based approach to support the justification
of Commercial Off-The-Shelf software (COTS) used in a safety-related system. Hussey in
[Hussey, 2000] was concerned with providing methods for analyzing safety-critical
interactive systems to detect design defects that would reduce system safety. The approach
presented is essentially a variant of the HAZOP. Bishop et al [Bishop 2002], described the
Software Criticality Analysis approach that was developed using HAZOP. A HAZOP
Study investigates the interactions between components and is carried out by a team. It is
suitable for initial phases of the design.
The FMEA is an inductive qualitative method of analysis that enables us to identify
elements having significant effects on system function in considered application. FMEA
evaluates the ways component of the system can fail and the effects these failures can have.
In a FMEA, each individual failure is considered as an independent occurrence with no
relation to other failures in the system. In [Zhu, 2002] FMEA is used for the analysis of
software and information systems to construct quality models of information systems.
Cichocki et al [Cichocki, 2000] demonstrate how object oriented modeling, extended with
formal notations, is used to model a problem related to computer based railway signaling in
order to support FMEA. FMEA investigates the failures of the components themselves and
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is often performed by an individual [Chudleigh, 1995]. FMEA identifies single failure
modes that either directly result in or contribute significantly to system failure.
FTA is a top-down method used to identify failure causes [NASA, 1995]. FTA is
primarily a means for analyzing causes of hazards, not identifying them. The process of
analyzing causes is documented in one or more fault trees. It should be noted that a fault
tree is not a model of the system or even a model of the ways in which the system could
fail. It is rather a depiction of the logical interrelationships of the basic events that may
lead to a particular undesired event. FTA is used to analysis a software hazard
[Papadopoulos, 1999]. Papadopoulos [Papadopoulos, 2001] summarizes the FTA
synthesis concept and discusses its application in the course of a continuous life-cycle
safety assessment process. Traverson in [Traverson, 1998] proposed a formal hazard
analysis technique using FTA to help designers understand the software requirements.
They investigated how the results of one safety analysis technique, FTA, are interpreted
as software safety requirements to be used in the program design process. Leveson et al
[Leveson, 1999], proposed an approach for the incorporation of safety analysis methods
in the software development process by using FTA for assessing safety properties of
software. Hansen et al [Hansen, 1998] investigated, how the results of one fault trees are
interpreted as software safety requirements to be used in the program design process. Liu
et al [Liu, 1996] proposed a model-based approach for safety analysis using fault trees.
Sere et al [Sere, 1997] used the results of FTA as a source of the formulation of
requirements that the embedded software should meet. The approach proposed by Clarke
and Clarke et al [Clarke, 1993] is based on representing the weakest precondition of a
program as a fault tree. FHA approaches the analysis of the top-level design from the
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functional viewpoint [ARP-4761 1996]. This technique aims to identify which functions
of the system contribute to hazards, thus assigning them a criticality level. FHA was
developed by the aerospace industry to bridge the gap between hardware and software
hazard

analysis,

since

functions

are

generally

identified

without

specific

implementations. It requires domain specific knowledge to produce meaningful results
from Functional Hazard Analysis. The FHA method is used for identifying safety hazards
at a functional level. It is a powerful method as it gives important input when structuring
the requirements. In [Papadopoulos 1999] Papadopoulos developed the FFA method by
extending FHA with guide words used in [McDermid, 2000] similar to the guide words
used in HAZOP [McDermid, 1995].
The ETA [NASA, 1995] is a technique by which the system safety engineer can
evaluate possible outcomes using a type of logic tree. It is an inductive logic method for
identifying the various possible outcomes of a given initiating event. ETA is appropriate
only after most of the design is complete. Thus, it has been used primarily to evaluate
existing designs. In [Lindsay, 2000] Lindsay used ETA for hazard identification and
analysis. A hazard analysis must be performed early in the software design, before any
concept or design solutions exist, to avoid costly design iterations. The value of early
hazard analysis has been thoroughly discussed by Leveson in [Leveson, 1995].
Automation has become increasingly more important [Gallow, 2002]. As systems
become more complex, it is progressively less tractable to carry out hazard analyses
manually. In computer HAZOP, the analysis remains manual activity in which analysts
are called to identify and relate hazards by examining data flows in software architecture.
As systems become more complex, manually performed hazard analyses become tedious,
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error prone, and time-consuming [Lindsay, 2000]. A hazard analysis technique must be
easy to automate or semi automate.
As the complexity of modern software systems increases, using one hazard
analysis technique at different stages of the design lifecycle is becoming increasingly
more problematic [Papadopoulos 1999], [Lindsay 2000]. These techniques assume
different design representations which reflect different levels of abstraction in the system
design. While, for example, FFA requires only abstract functional descriptions, HAZOP
and FMEA require architectural designs of increasing detail and complexity. We must
find a methodology to guarantee the consistency of the design as it evolves in the course
of the lifecycle. All of this motivates the needs for a new hazard analysis technique.
We integrate more than one classical hazard analysis technique introducing a new
technique that could be implemented early on in the design phase. This hazard analysis
technique is used for the severity analysis and it could be automated because it is based
on data that could be collected as well as analysis from UML diagrams [Hassan, 2003C].
3.2.2 UML and hazard analysis

In this section we discuss UML as a foundation for a new hazard analysis
technique. To develop a hazard analysis technique, the relationship between the system
and the environment should be defined sufficiently clearly so it could be possible to
identify how system failures may cause harm (i.e., the system boundary is clear). The
UML use case is used to capture requirements in early design phases. Thus, use cases are
recommended as input to the FFA, to give a good picture of possible functional failures
in a system [Johannessen, 2001]. In [Wedde, 1999] Wedde proposed the use of HAZOP
UML based software system design.
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For successful hazard analysis technique, the operation of the system has to be
defined sufficiently clearly to indicate how normal or abnormal operation might cause
system failure, and how the consequences of the system failure depend upon the
operational state or mode. Because UML diagrams capture the dynamic behavior of the
system it is a good candidate for a successful hazard analysis technique. Using UML
[Atkinson 1998] as a foundation for hazard analysis will aid in understanding the system
behavior before detailed design. By using UML models as a basis for the hazard analysis
technique, system failures could be designed out of the system before it is developed and
used.
The use of UML as a foundation of a new hazard analysis technique is motivated be the
fact that UML models represent many level of abstraction of the system and capture its
dynamic and static behavior.
The next section is the proposed severity analysis methodology which is based on UML
artifacts. The methodology
It automates and integrates more than one hazard analysis technique in order to
assess the severity of each architectural element (component/connector) of the software
as well as the system level severity.
3.2.3. Severity analysis

In [Sherer, 1989] Sherer proposed a methodology to estimate the consequences of
software failure caused by faults in different software modules. Sherer used one hazard
analysis technique FTA and software operational profile to estimate the cost of failure for
every software module. This is a complex process to be automated and it was applied in
the later phase of software development life cycle. Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 2002] used
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FMEA to assess the severity of software (components/connectors) failure. Using one
hazard analysis technique for severity analysis usually fails to offer a coherent and
complete picture of the ways in which low-level component failures contribute to
hazardous malfunctions of the system. Yacoub and Sherer used one hazard analysis
technique. Hazard analysis techniques assume different design representations which
reflect different levels of abstraction in the system design. While, for example, FFA
requires only abstract functional descriptions, HAZOP and FMEA require architectural
designs of increasing detail and complexity. It is not necessarily enough to use only one
analysis technique

[Allenby, 2001].

Often a combination of more than one technique, based

on UML, should be used in order to gain a more complete understanding of the system
[Hassan, 2003b].
In chapter 6 we propose a methodology for severity analysis based on UML
diagrams. The proposed methodology is based on a number of classical hazard
techniques such as FFA, FMEA and FTA. It automates and integrates these techniques in
order to assess the severity of each architectural element (component/connector) of the
software.
3.3 Risk Assessment

A wide range of traditional fault-proneness prediction models has been proposed
for assessing the fault proneness of a software system. These models use complexity and
size metrics to predict software components fault proneness. These models are quantitative
models that can be used to predict which software components are high risk keeping in
mind that the definition of a high risk component varies depending on the context. For
example, a high risk component may be one that contains any faults found during testing
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[Briand, 1993a], [Lanubile, 1997], [Harrison, 1988], or one that contains any faults found
during operation [Khoshgoftaar, 1999], or one that is costly to correct after an error has
been found [Almeida, 1998], [Basili, 1997], [Briand, 1993b]. Some models make binary
predictions as to whether a software component is faulty or not-faulty [El-Emam, 1999],
[El-Emam, 2001a], [Khoshgoftaar, 1999], [Lanubile, 1997]. These models are also used for
ranking software components according to risk proneness.
Silke et al [Silke, 1999] proposed a model to estimate the probability of failure of a
software system consisting of components. Briand et al [Briand, 1998] used multivariate
logistic regression to build a prediction model for the fault-proneness of classes. Ping et al
[Ping, 2000] proposed a statistical technique of mixture model analysis as a tool for early
prediction of fault-prone software modules. Lanubile et al [Lanubile, 1995] proposed a
model for identifying high/low-risk of software components based on software complexity
metrics. Maurizio et al [Maurizio, 1997] proposed a model to predict defect-prone software
modules in a software system based on its complexity. Hochman et al [Hochman, 1996]
applied the genetic algorithm to developing optimal or near optimal back propagation
neural networks for fault-prone/not-fault-prone classification of software modules.
Toshihiro et al [Toshihiro, 1999] proposed a method to estimate the fault-proneness of the
class in the early phase, using several complexity metrics for object-oriented software.
Wong et al [Wong, 1998] proposed hybrid metrics to identify fault-prone software
modules. Benlarbi [Benlarbi, 1999] proposed a model that serves as an early predictors of
classes that contain faults.
But all of these traditional models do not consider the fact that the consequences of
various software failures caused by faults will be very different. Science software failures
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have different consequences; any measure of software fault proneness must include the
measurement of the consequence of failure (severity).
Based on the definition of heuristic risk factor [Ammar, 1997] as a measure of risk,
Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 2002] developed an architecture level risk assessment methodology
of software system taking into consideration the severity of software failure. Yacoub used a
set of dynamic metrics extracted from a simulation model of the UML artifacts and used
the FMEA for severity assessment. But risk assessment based on UML simulation model is
time consuming and tedious work. Using FMEA only for severity analysis is not enough as
we mentioned earlier in “Hazard Analysis Review”.
To help in developing risk based test plans, we propose a risk assessment
methodology for the software architecture. This methodology is based on measurements
that could be collected and analyzed early on in the software life cycle. It considers the
severity of software failure as well as the probability of that failure. This methodology is
performed integrating more than one hazard analysis technique based on dynamic
specification of static UML model. To automate the proposed methodology we have
proposed a tool support for the automation of this methodology.
3.4 Summary

This literature review indicates the absence of research for early software product
risk assessment. Most of the work does not differentiate between risk assessment and fault
proneness. It also indicates the lake of concrete methodologies for risk assessment early on
the design phases. This literature review indicates that there is a need for clear methods for
software severity analysis. It motivates us also to explore the dynamic metrics based on the
UML artifacts.
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Chapter 4
Dynamic Specifications Metrics using UML Static Models

4.1 Introduction

The fact that the usage of metrics in the analysis and design of object oriented OO
software can help designers make better decisions is gaining relevance in the software
measurement arena [Fenton, 2000]. Moreover, the necessity of having early indicators of
external quality attributes, such as maintainability, based on early metrics is growing.
These metrics are based either on the static view of the design; i.e., its class
diagrams, [Marcela, 2003] or the source code [Chidamber, 1994] of the classes. These
static metrics deal with the class code or the structure of the class. These types of static
metrics do not consider the class behavior or its execution environment. However, the
level of exposure of a software component is a function of its execution environment.
Hence, dynamic metrics [Khoshgoftaar, 1993] evolved as a measure of complexity of the
subset of code that is actually executed. Dynamic metrics was discussed by Munson et al
[Munson, 1996] for reliability assessment purposes. The authors emphasized that it is
essential to consider complex modules and its frequency of execution, in addition to its
complexity. Ammar et al [Ammar, 1997] extended dynamic metrics definitions to
incorporate concurrency complexity. They further used Colored Petri Nets models to
measure dynamic complexity of software systems using simulation reports. To measure
the dynamic behavior of an object in OO system Poel et al [Poel, 1999] define a so-called
distance-based approach, which describes and measures the dynamic behavior of objects.
Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 1999] proposed a dynamic metrics (dynamic complexity and
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dynamic coupling) based on the execution of UML simulation model of the software
system. Using simulation model of the system to measure dynamic metrics is a more
tedious and time consuming process than using UML models at system design phase.
In this chapter, we build up on metrics proposed in [Yacoub, 1999] to estimate the
dynamic metrics (complexity and coupling) of a software architectural element
(component/connector) early on the software design phase. This proposed approach
[Hassan, 2001] is based on static analysis of UML diagrams of the software system not
based on execution of the simulation models as proposed in [Yacoub, 1999]. The
proposed dynamic complexity metrics could be used for the estimation of probability of
software component/connector failure early on the design phase of the software life cycle
[Katerina, 2003].
The software system design phase serves as the foundation for all software
engineering steps that follow. Design phase is important in this respect, since many of the
critical decisions stem from the product design. In the design phase, it's still cost-effective
to modify the software design, and the software can also be described accurately enough
to be measurable [Roger, 1997]. Our proposed dynamic metrics is based on UML
diagrams developed at the design phase.
We proceed in this chapter as follows: Section 4.2 describes the dynamic
complexity metrics, Section 4.3 describes the dynamic coupling metrics, Case study is
presented in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 is the conclusion.
4.2 Dynamic Complexity Metrics

Dynamic complexity metrics guide the process of identifying complex
components. As a result, components could be ranked based its complexity. Components
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in a system have a life cycle; they enter into an initial state after creation, when they are
triggered (e.g. by messages, events, etc), and may change state. At some moment in time,
they enter an ending state. The life of component in a system is a dynamic property. We
need some kind of state transition model to measure component complexity during its life
cycle [Poels, 1999]. The state machine view describes the dynamic behavior of
components over the time by modeling the lifecycle of components. Each component is
treated as an isolated entity that communicates with the rest of the world by detecting
events and responding to them. A transition defines the response of a component in the
state to the occurrence of an event. A statechart store information about component life
cycle and component behavior [Booch, 1999]. Both the number of states in the state chart
as well as the number of transitions can be measures for a component's dynamic
complexity [Khoshgoftaar, 1999].
Based on state diagrams of the UML model, we could estimate dynamic
complexity metrics. This metrics could be estimated during a specific scenario of
interaction (sequence diagram). Based on a state chart of components interacted during
sequence diagram, we could compute dynamic metrics for each component.
Measurements could be extended for all scenarios under specific use case. Also use case
and system level complexity could be estimated by providing the profile of operation of
all scenarios and use cases.
4.2.1 Dynamic complexity of a component (dcoix )

In 1976 McCabe introduced cyclomatic complexity as a measure of program
complexity [McCabe, 1976]. It is obtained from the control flow graph and defined
as CC = e − n + 2 , where e is number of edges and n is number of nodes in the control
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flow graph. We propose a measure of component complexity similar to McCabe’s
cyclomatic complexity. However, in contrast to McCabe’s cyclometric complexity,
which is based on the control flow graph of the source code, the proposed metric for
component’s dynamic complexity is based on the UML state charts that are available
during early stages of the software life cycle. The state chart of a component i has a
number of states and transition between these states that describe the dynamic behavior
of the component. For each scenario S x a subset of all states of component i are visited
and a subset of all transitions is traversed. Let Cix denote the subset of states for a
component i visited in the scenario S x and with Ti x the subset of transitions traversed in
the state chart of component i in the scenario S x . The subset of states Cix and the
corresponding transitions Ti x are mapped into a control flow graph. The number of nodes
in this graph is cix = Cix ; this number is the cardinality of Cix . Similarly, the number of
edges in this graph is tix = Ti x ; this number is the cardinality of Ti x . It follows that the
dynamic complexity dcoix of component i in scenario S x is defined as
dcoix = t ix − cix + 2 .

4-1

4.2.2 Normalized dynamic complexity of a component ( DOCix )

The normalized dynamic complexity DOCix of a component i in scenario S x is
obtained by normalizing the dynamic complexity dcoix with respect to the sum of
complexities for all active components in scenario S x
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dcoix
DOC =
∑ dcokx
x
i

4-2

k∈S x

where DOCix (0 ≤ DOCix ≤ 1) is the normalized complexity of the i th component
in the scenario S x . This normalized complexity is used as the probability of failure of a
component [Hassan, 2001].
4.3 Dynamic Coupling Metrics

Coupling between components provides important information for identifying
possible sources of exporting errors, identifying tightly coupled components, and testing
interactions between components. The proposed dynamic coupling metrics extend the
previous work in [Yacoub, 1999]; measurements are calculated for the design model
during a specific scenario. Furthermore, they can be extended for all scenarios in all use
cases of the system. The dynamic coupling of a connector is based on the number of
messages that are carried by the connector.
Our approach in this part is to calculate the measurements directly from the UML
scenario diagrams, not from execution of the simulation model [Yacoub, 1999]. Dynamic
coupling metrics calculated from simulation models [Yacoub, 1999] are defined as export
dynamic coupling and import dynamic coupling. The difference between export and
import coupling is in the direction of data and control flow from/to a component in the
architecture. Export coupling dealings with coupling as a component sends messages or
data to other components. Import coupling dealings with coupling as a component
receives messages or data from other components in the architecture. We use export
dynamic coupling for this proposed dynamic coupling. Export coupling accounts for the
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fact that an error in a currently executing component could be exported to the called
component.
4.3.1 Normalized dynamic coupling of a connector ( EOCijx )

Define EOCijx as a measure of mutual coupling between two specific components
( i and j ). Let denote with MTijx the set of messages sent from component i to
component j during the execution of scenario S x and with MT x the set of all messages
exchanged between all components active during the execution of scenario S x . Then, we
define the export coupling EOC ijx from component i to component j in scenario S x as a
ratio of the number of messages sent from i to j and the total number of messages
exchanged in the scenario S x .
EOC =
x
ij

MTijx

i, j ∈ S x , i ≠ j
MT x

4-3

Where EOCijx (0 ≤ EOC ijx ≤ 1) is the normalized coupling for the connector
between i th and j th components in the scenario S x . Normalized dynamic coupling of a
connector is used as the probability of failure of connector between components
[Katerina, 2003].
4.4 Case study

In this section, we explain the specifications of Cardiac Pacemaker system. Also
we show how the proposed methodology applied using this case study as illustrative
example. Cardiac pacemaker is an implanted device that assists cardiac functions when
the underlying pathologies lower intrinsic heartbeats. An error in the software operation
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of the device can cause loss of a patient’s life. This is an example of a critical real-time
application. We use the UML Real-Time notion [Rational, 2001] to model the
pacemaker. Figure 4.1 shows the components and connectors of the pacemaker in the
capsule diagram [Yacoub, 1999]. The Figure also shows the input/output port to the
Heart as an external component as well as the two input ports to the ReedSwitch and the
CoilDriver components. A pacemaker can be programmed to operate in one of the five

operational modes depending on which part of the heart is to be sensed and which part is
to be paced.

Figure 4.1 the components and connectors of the pacemaker in the capsule diagram

The main components of the cardiac pacemaker system are described as follows:
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ReedSwitch(RS): A magnetically activated switch that must be closed before

programming the device. The switch is used to avoid accidental programming by electric
noise.
CoilDriver(CD): Receives/sends pulses from/to the device programmer. These pulses are

counted and then interpreted as bit values of zero or one. These bits are then grouped into
bytes and sent to the communication gnome. Positive and negative acknowledgments, as
well as programming bits, are sent back to the programmer to confirm whether the device
has been correctly programmed and the commands validated.
CommunicationGnome(CG): Receives bytes from the Coil Driver, verifies these bytes as

commands, and sends the commands to the Ventricular and Atrial models. It sends the
positive and negative acknowledgments to the Coil Driver to verify command processing.
AtrialModel(AR) and VentricularModel(VT): These two components are similar in

operation. They both could pace the heart and/or sense the heartbeats. Once the
pacemaker is programmed, the magnet is removed from the RS. The AR and VT
communicate together without further intervention. Only battery decay or some medical
maintenance reasons may force reprogramming.
4.4.1 The Use case model

The pacemaker runs in either a programming mode or in one of five operational
modes. During programming, the programmer specifies the operation mode in which the
device will work. The operation mode depends on whether the Atrial (A), Ventricular (V)
or both are being monitored or paced. The programmer also specifies whether the pacing
is inhibited (I), triggered (T) or dual (D). For example in the AVI operation mode, the
Atrial portion (A) of the heart is paced (shocked), the Ventricular portion (V) of the heart
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is sensed (monitored) and the Atrial is only paced when a Ventricular sense does not
occur (inhibited mode). The use case diagram of the pacemaker application is given in
Figure 4.2. It presents the six use cases the two actors namely doctor's programmer and
patient's heart. Each use case in Figure 4.2 is realized by at least one sequence diagram

(i.e., scenario). Domain experts determine probabilities of occurrence of use cases and the
scenarios within each use case. This can be done in a similar fashion as the estimation of
the operational profile in the field of software reliability [Musa, 1996].
According to [Douglass, 2000], inhibit modes are more frequently used than the
triggered mode [Douglass, 2000]. Also, the programming mode is executed significantly
less frequently than the regular usage of the pacemaker in any of its operational modes.
Hence, we assume the probabilities for programming use case of five operational use
cases (AVI, AAI, AAT, VVI and VVT) as given in table 4.1.

DoctorsProgramer

Programming
Mode

Programming

Operating_in_AVI

Operating_in_ AAI

Operating_in_ AAT Operating_in_ VVI Operating_in_ VVT

Operational
Modes

PatientsHeart

Figure 4.2 Pace maker use case diagram
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Use case
Programming AVI AAI VVI AAT VVT
Probability
0.01
0.29 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.15
Table 4.1 Probabilities of the use cases executions
In the programming use case, the programmer interacts with the RS and CD
components to input a set of 8 bits specifying an operation mode for the pacemaker. This
byte is received by the CG component, which, in turn, sets the operation mode of the AR
and VT components to one of five modes (or use cases): AVI, AAI, AAT, VVI, and VVT.
Appendix A shows a scenario from the AVI use case in which the VT keeps sensing the
heart and the AR paces the heart whenever a heart beat is not sensed. As in all scenarios, a
refractory period is then in effect after every pace. Every use case is mapped to one
scenario. The first is Programming scenario in which the programmer sets the operation
mode of the device. The programmer applies a magnet to enable communication with the
device, and then sends pulses to the device which in turn interpret these pulses into
programming bits. The device then sends back the data to acknowledge valid/invalid
program. The second scenario is the AVI scenario. In this scenario, the VT component
monitors the heart. When a heart beat is not sensed, the AR component paces the heart
and a refractory period is then in effect. The third (fourth) scenario is the VVI (AAI)
scenario in which the VT component (AR component) paces the heart when it does not
sense any heart pulse. The fifth (sixth) scenario is the VVT (AAT) in which the VT
component (AR component) continuously paces the heart.
The detailed scenario diagrams and the rest of the results of the pacemaker are
shown in appendix A.
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Figure 4.3 shows the sequence diagram of the programming scenario of the
pacemaker system, which we use to illustrate dynamic complexity of components interact
during this scenarios and dynamic coupling of connectors between components in this
scenarios.
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Figure 4.3 Sequence diagram of the programming scenario
4.4.2 Dynamic complexity of components

As described in section 4.2 we use a measure of component complexity similar to
McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity. However, in contrast to McCabe’s cyclometric
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complexity, which is based on the control flow graph of the source code, the state chart of
each component i has a number of states and transition between these states that describe
the dynamic behavior of the component. For each scenario S x a subset of all states of
component i are visited and a subset of all transitions is traversed. Figure 4.4 shows a
subset of states of CD component in the programming scenario. The control flow graph
of the CD component in the programming scenario is presented in Figure 4.4. The
dynamic complexity of this graph is evaluated using equation 4.1 and normalized with
respect to the sum of complexities of all active components in this scenario (RS, CD, and
CG) using equation 4.2.

Table 4.2 shows the normalized dynamic complexity for all components active in
the programming scenario.

Idle

Receiving

Transmit

Waiting
for transmit
Waiting
for bit

Figure 4.4 control flow graph for states and transitions of the CD component in the
programming scenario
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Component

DOCix (Dynamic Complexity)

0.5
CD
0.2
RS
0.3
CG
Table 4.2 Normalized dynamic complexity of components in the programming scenario
Dynamic complexity of all components interacts within the pacemaker scenarios
are given in Table 4-3.
Scenario
Name
Programming
AVI
AAI
VVI
AAT
VVT

RS
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Component Dynamic Complexity
CD
CG
AR
VT
0.5
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.00017
0.60135
0.34837
0.0
0.0009
0.999
0.0
0.0
0.0009
0.0
0.999
0.0
0.0005
0.9995
0.0
0.0
0.0005
0.0
0.9995

Table 4.3 component dynamic complexity for all scenarios in pacemaker.
Figure 4.5 shows the 3D pars for components dynamic complexity Vs scenarios
in the pacemaker system.

Figure 4.5 3D pars for components dynamic complexity Vs scenarios
of the pacemaker.
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We conclude from table 4.3 and Figure 4.5 that the dynamic complexity of the
component AR and VT are significantly higher than those for other components in more
than one scenario. This is due to the fact that those two components are active and
executing most of the time.
4.4.3 Dynamic coupling of connectors

Dynamic coupling metrics are calculated for active connectors during execution
of a specific scenario. We compute these metrics directly from the UML sequence
diagrams by applying the set of formulas given in section 4.3. Based on equation 4.3, we
calculate dynamic coupling of connectors in the programming scenario shown in Table
4.4 shows the dynamic coupling matrix for the connectors in this scenario.
We use the matrix representation for coupling where rows and columns are
indexed by components and the off-diagonal matrix cells represent coupling between the
two components of the corresponding row and column [Hassan, 2001]. The row index
indicates the sending component, while the column index indicates the receiving
component. For example, the cell with row=RS and column=CD is the export coupling
value from RS to CD. On the other side, the cell with row=CD and column=RS is the
export coupling value from CD to RS. For example, the value along the row RS and the
column CD in table 4.4 is 0.125. This is read as dynamic coupling of the connector from
RS to CD.
RS

CD

CG

RS

0

0.125

0.125

CD

0

0

0.375

CG

0

0.375

0

Table 4.4 Dynamic coupling of connectors in the programming scenario
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Table 4-5 and Figure 4.6 show the results from applying the proposed dynamic
coupling metrics for all connectors for all scenarios of the pacemaker system.
Connector Dynamic Coupling
Scenario
Name
RS-CD RS-CG CD-CG CG-CD CG-AR CG-VT AR-VT VT-AR
0.375
0.375
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Programming 0.125 0.125
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.90E-04 3.90E-04 0.097
0.9
AVI
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1
0.0
0.0
0.0
AAI
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1
0.0
0.0
VVI
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1
0.0
0.0
0.0
AAT
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1
0.0
0.0
VVT
Table 4.5 dynamic coupling for every connector in each scenario for pacemaker system

Figure 4.6 3D par for connectors dynamic coupling Vs scenarios
These results have identified that components CG, AR, VT are the most dynamic
coupled components; this is due to the fact that these components are the most active
components in more than one scenario and these components send messages to each
other most of the time. These components usually communicate with each other and with
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the heart for sensing and monitoring. These components control the operational
processing of the system.
4.4.4 Validating the Dynamic metrics

In order to validate the proposed dynamic metrics we compared the predicted
results derived from the proposed dynamic metrics with those derived from the
simulation model built in [Yacoub, 1999] for the same case study.
The idea of using simulation models to evaluate predictive techniques is explored
in [Shepperd, 2001]; Shepperd proposed the using a simulation model results for
evaluating four predictive techniques.
To compare the results obtained by the proposed metrics with the results obtained
from the simulation model [Yacoub, 1999]; we average the components/connectors
dynamic metrics for all scenarios in the pacemaker system based on the operational
profile of the pacemaker system. Table 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show the system level
component dynamic complexity and the simulation results obtained in [Yacoub, 1999].
The correlation of the result obtained by the two methods is shown.
System level component dynamic complexity
RS
CD
CG
AR
VT
Dynamic complexity
normalized
to the maximum one
0.0038 0.0095
Simulation Model results
Normalized to the maximum one 0.002
0.013
Correlation = 0.99732405

0.0068 1
0.005

0.86
1

0.963

Table 4.6 system level component dynamic complexity vs. simulation model results
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Dynamis Complexity

System Level Component Dynamic Complexity
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Simulation Model
Result
Proposed model
Result

RS

CD

CG

AR

VT

Components

Figure 4.7 System level component dynamic complexities vs. simulation model result
Table 4-7 and Figure 4.8 show the system level results derived from the proposed
dynamic coupling and the results derived from the simulation.
System level dynamic coupling
RS-CD RS-CG CD-CG CG-CD CG-AR CG-VT AR-VT VT-AR
Dynamic coupling
normalized to
the maximum one
0.00357 0.00357 0.0107 0.0107
1
1
0.0803 0.7455
Simulation Model result
Normalized to the maximum one 0.0014 0.0014 0.003 0.002 0.0014 0.0014 0.25 0.27
Correlation = 0.088739

Connector Coupling

Table 4.7 System level connector dynamic coupling Vs. simulation model result
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Simulation
Model Result
Proposed model

RSCD

RSCG

CDCG

CGCGCD
AR
Connector

CGVT

ARVT

VTAR

Figure 4.8 System level connector dynamic coupling Vs. simulation model result
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From Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 the comparison shows a high correlation for
dynamic complexity but poor correlation for dynamic coupling. This may be due to the
fact that Yacoub [Yacoub, 1999] counted the message exchange between heart and
programmer in his calculation but this is not the case in our calculation. We do not
consider the heart and programmer as a part of our software system; we consider heart
and programmer as external actors. They are not part of the pacemaker software system.
4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we define two dynamic metrics (dynamic complexity/dynamic
coupling) for software architectural element (component/connector). Measurements using
these proposed metrics can be obtained at early development phases from UML models.
The metrics are applied to a pacemaker case study and measurements are compared to
results from execution models [Yacoub, 1999] to show the validity of the metrics. The
comparison shows a high correlation of the proposed method with the simulation results
obtained in [Yacoub, 1999] for dynamic complexity. The results of dynamic coupling
show low correlation with [Yacoub, 1999]. This low correlation could be because
Yacoub [Yacoub, 1999] considers actors at every scenario as a part of the software
system. He considers the messages exchanged between the actors and the system as a part
of all messages exchanged in each scenario. We consider the actors at every scenario as
external entity and actors are not part of our software system. We do not consider the
messages exchanged between the actors and the system as part of our calculations. In
future work, we could validate coupling metrics using another case study. We could also
explore the dependency between static and dynamic metrics, and empirically validate the
proposed metrics and their correlation with design quality attributes.
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Chapter 5
UML Based Severity Analysis Methodology

5.1 Introduction

Severity assessment is a procedure by which the severity of failures of software
architectural element (component/connector) is estimated and ranked accordingly to the
consequences of these failures. In the MIL_STD_1629A standard [MIL_STD, 1986],
severity considers the worst case consequence of a failure, determined by the degree of
injury, property damage, system damage, and mission loss that could eventually occur.
Considering the severity of software failures will help in allocating development
and testing resources [Rosenberg, 1999]. Some software modules may be tested more
intensively than others based on the severity of failure weighted by the probability of
failure. In [Katerina, 2003], we proposed an architectural level software risk assessment
methodology. The proposed risk methodology combined the probability of software
failure with the severity of this failure to estimate the risk factor of software architectural
element early on the software design phase. The probability of failure is estimated based
on software dynamic metrics [Hassan, 2001]. In this report we propose a methodology
for estimating severity of failures of software components/connectors as well as severity
of failures of system execution scenarios early on during software development.
Sherer in [Sherer, 1988] proposed a methodology to estimate the consequences of
software failure caused by faults in different software modules. Sherer used FTA and
software operational profile to estimate the cost of failure for every software module.
This is a complex process to be automated and it was applied at the code level in the later
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phases of software development. Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 2002] used FMEA to assess the
severity of software (components/connectors) failure. Using one hazard analysis
technique for severity analysis usually fails to offer a coherent and complete picture of
the ways in which low-level component failures contribute to hazardous malfunctions of
the system. Hazard analysis techniques assume different design representations which
reflect different levels of abstraction in the system design. While, for example, FFA
requires only abstract functional descriptions, HAZOP [McDermid, 1995] and FMEA
require architectural designs of increasing detail and complexity. As shown by Allenby and
Kelly in [Allenby, 2001] it is not enough to only use one severity analysis technique in
complex systems. Often a combination of more than one technique should be used to get
a more complete understanding of the system. The suitability of UML [Boosh, 1999] to
be the specification language for severity analysis using more than one classical hazard
analysis method was briefly discussed in [Hassan, 2003b], [Guiochet, 2003]. We propose
a methodology for severity analysis of software systems at the early phases of
development based on UML. This chapter is organized as follows, Section 5.2 presents
the proposed methodology; Section 5.3 presents the illustrative case study; and Section
5.4 provides the conclusions and future work.
5.2 The proposed severity analysis methodology

The proposed severity analysis methodology starts early in the development phase
with FFA which uses system level scenario diagrams as an input to identify all system
level hazards [Johannessen, 2001]. This high level FFA analysis gives us a
comprehensive view of the ways in which the system could fail. System level failures
arise as a result of failures or malfunctions of lower level components/connectors.
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Therefore we apply FMEA as the second step of the process, at the level of components
and connectors using UML sequence diagrams to determine their failure modes and cost
of failure for each failure mode. We use FTA as a third step to define a relationship
between failures of individual architecture elements (component/connector) and a failure
of the system. The system hazards identified in step 1 will be used as top events in the
fault tree and the basic events are the failure modes identified in step 2. The fourth step of
this process is to develop the cost of failure graph [Sherer, 1988] to estimate cost of
failure for each execution scenario and every component/connector in the scenario. The
final step is to map estimated cost of failure of scenario and each component/connector to
a severity rank using the cost severity graph introduced in [Kmenta, 2000].
Figure 5.1 shows the schematic diagram of the proposed severity analysis
methodology, and the steps of the methodology for a given scenario are summarized as
follows:
1. Identify system hazards (states of the system that can contribute to accidents
and mishaps) by performing FFA [Carpenter, 1999].
2. Identify

components/connectors

failure

modes

by

performing

FMEA

[MIL_STD, 1986].
3. Construct a detailed cause and effect model that records how failures propagate
from components/connectors level through the system level by using FTA. This
step combines the outputs from step 1 and step 2.
4. Develop the Cost of Failure Graph to estimate cost of failure of a given
execution scenario and each component/connector in this scenario [Sherer,
1988].
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5. Estimate the severity of each component/connector and system scenario using
cost of failure graph [Sherer, 1988] and cost severity graph [Kmenta, 2000].

1
4

FFA
Use Case
Diagrams,
System
Scenario
Diagrams

UML
Specs
Sequence
Diagrams
Component/
Connector
interactions
Object : Class

Object : Class

Object : Class

Scenario
Severity

(List of scenario
level Hazards)

FTA

(List of Component/Connector
Failure Modes)

5

Cost of Failure
Graph

Component/
connector
Severity

3

FMEA
(Complete List of Failure modes
of Components/Connectors)

2

Figure 5.1 severity analysis methodology schematic diagram
5.2.1 Functional Failure Analysis (FFA)

Figure 5.2 shows a UML use case diagram for a system S, where actor Act1
performs the two Use Cases Uc1 and Uc2 through association Ass1 and Ass2, and actor
Act2 performs the Use Case Uc1 through Ass3. Figure 5.3 shows a high level system

sequence diagram [Carpenter, 1999] which describes one scenario of the Use Case Uc1
showing the interactions between actors Act1, Act2 and the system through input and
output events. Events like E11s, E21s, E3s1, and E4s1 are the events between the system S
and Act1. Events E1s2, E22s, and E3s2 are events between the System S and the Act2. The
system states are S1, S2, S3, and S4 ,which are the states of the system after receiving or
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sending event to the external actors (Act1, Act2 ) The input events (E11s, E21s, E22s ) in
Figure 5.3 represent external events that stimulate responses from the system. The output
events (E3s1, E4s1, E1s2, E3s2) represent the externally observable behavior of the system.

Uc1

Ass

A ss1

3

A ss

2

Act1

Act2

Uc2

Figure 5.2 A Use Case diagram for a system S

System: S

Act2

Act1
S1

E11s
S2

E1s2

E21s
S3

E3s1

E22s
S4

E4s1
E3s2

Figure 5.3 high level system sequence diagram
The process starts with FFA based on the annotated system scenario diagram
Figure 5.4. We perform FFA using guide words defined in Table 5-1 [McDermid, 2000]
to identify possible failure modes for each event between the system and the actors (E11s,
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E21s, E22s..,….), and (Act1, Act2 ). The events are systematically examined for potential

hazards which include the loss of event, the unintended delivery of event and event
malfunctions. The analysis considers each event in turn and decides whether or not these
hypothetical failure modes are credible and, if they are, what the consequences might be.

This gives a clear view of how the failure of these events could contribute to hazards and
accidents during the scenario. The input to FFA is a list of events of system level scenario
belonging to Uc1, list of guide words [McDermid, 2000], and cost of failure for every
class of failure figure 5.4.

System: S

Act2

Act1
S1

E11s
List of Guide Words, Cost of hazard

S2

E1s2

E21s

List of Guide Words, Cost of hazard
List of Guide Words,Cost of hazard

S3

E3s1

E22s

List of Guide Words,Cost of hazard

S4

List of Guide Words, Cost of hazard

E4s1
List of Guide Words,Cost of hazard

E3s2

List of Guide Words, Cost of hazard

Figure 5.4 The annotated system level sequence diagram of use case UC1 for
system S
The output of FFA is a tabulated form (see Table 5-2). The results of FFA are
provided early in the design process; these results provide a comprehensive picture of the
ways that the system could fail.
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Guide Word
Omission
Commission
Early

Meaning
A necessary action does not occur.
An unwanted action is performed.
An action is performed before the time (either real time,
or relative to some other action) at which it is required.
An action is performed after the time at which it is required.
Late
The timing of the action is correct, but the data with which it is
Value
performed with or upon is incorrect.
Table 5-1 Guide words
5.2.2 Components/Connectors Failure Modes

FMEA examines component/connector failures considering component/connector
malfunctions.
It generates a failure model for the components/connectors under examination;
FMEA is essentially a tabular process. FMEA is applied for each component/connector
within the sequence diagram. During specific scenario, components interact with each
other by exchanging messages. Each of these interactions links a component that requests
an operation with a component that performs the operation. All these interactions,
collaboration and component behavior are captured in sequence diagrams. For example
Figure 5.5 shows sequence diagram which corresponds to a system scenario in Figure
5.3.

54

Component C1

Component C2

Component C3

Act1

Act2
St11

St21

St31

E11s
M13
E1s2
M12

St22

E21s
M23
E3s1
St32

E22s

M31
E4s1

St12

E3s2

Figure 5.5 Sequence diagram of components C1, C2 and C3 interaction

The “initiating” actor Act1 starts the scenario by sending the initial event to the
system. The sequence diagram models messages (M12, M21 , M13…) sequence among
components C1, C2, C3, and actors Act1, Act2.
The behavior of each component could be captured with the component state
diagram during this scenario. The component changes its states through interactions
based on message exchange. A hazard occurs from unwanted interactions (or events).
Each of the unwanted events in the sequence is either due to a message being sent
incorrectly by the sender component, or the message not being acted on correctly by the
receiver component or the connector not acting well. These events can be generated by
sender or receiver state transitions. Therefore faults in component state or transitions can
give reasons for a component/connector failure [Lindsay, 1997]. It is necessary to
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confirm that under correct behavior of components/connectors, the system doesn’t allow
the occurrence of the hazards. That is, if the components in the system correctly generate
the intended messages, are in the correct state, and connector transmit correct message,
then the system will not fail. This means that no failure will happen to
components/connector.
In order to identify possible faulty behaviors for the components we can apply
FMEA to the states of the components [DiMarco, 1995], [Charles, 1997]. We identify
hazards associated with each component, detail all possible failure modes, and identify
their resulting effect on the system. The output of this process is a tabulated form (see
Table 5-3 section 5.3.2).
A Connector is defined as the interface between two components [Yacoub, 2003].
The Connector transmits the messages between the components. By applying FMEA on
connectors using the messages transmitted through these connectors, we can identify
connectors’ failure modes and the effect of these failures on the system. We identify
hazards associated with each connector, detail all possible failure modes, and identify
their resulting effect on the system.
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Component C1
Act1

Cost of Failure, Probability

Component C3

Component C2

Cost of Failure, Probability

St11

St21

Act2
St31 Cost of Failure, Probability

E11s
M13

Cost of Failure, Probability

Cost of Failure, Probability

E1s2
M12

St22

E21s

Cost of Failure, Probability
Cost of Failure, Probability

M23
E3s1

Cost of Failure, Probability
St32

M31
E4s1

E22s

Cost of Failure, Probability

St12

Cost of Failure, Probability

E3s2

Figure 5.6 Annotated sequence diagram
5.2.3 Fault Tree Analysis

FTA is a top-down method used to identify failure causes [Kirsten, 1998]. FTA is
primarily a means for analyzing causes of hazards, not identifying hazards. The process
of analyzing causes is documented in one or more fault trees. FTA is a depiction of the
logical interrelationships of the basic events that may lead to a particular undesired event.
FTA is used for addressing low level failure conditions (basic events) and their potential
effect for causing the top level hazards (top events) [Johannessen, 2001]. Failure of
components/connectors (low level) will propagate to the system level (higher level). We
use FTA to map system level hazards (output from FFA) to components/connectors
failure modes (output from FMEA). The top events of the fault trees are the system level
hazards and the basic events are the components/connectors failure modes.
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5.2.4

Cost of Failure Graph

Kmenta in [Kmenta, 2000] describes failure scenarios as “undesired cause-effect
chains of events, from the initiating cause to end effect, including all intermediate
effects”. Each failure scenario happens with some probability and results in negative

consequences. With FTA considered as a cause effect model [Liu, 2000], using FTA
results in many cause effect chains with probabilities for each cause and effect. These
cause-effect chains relate the system level hazard identified from FFA to
components/connectors failure modes identified from FMEA. Considering these causeeffect chains as failure scenarios for the system, we could estimate the cost of failure of
each component/connector based on these failure scenarios.
Cost is an accepted measure of consequences [Gilchrist, 1993]. Expected cost is
used extensively in the fields of Risk Analysis, Economics, Insurance, and Decision
Theory [Gilchrist, 1993]. Kmenta and Ishii [Kmenta, 2000] proposed an adaptation of
FMEA considering the consequences of the failures in terms of costs. Cost is a universal
language understood by engineers without ambiguity. We develop cost of failure graph
for every component/connector and scenario to estimate cost of failure of every
component/connector and scenario. For a specific component/connector there is more
than one failure scenario, the expected cost of failure for component/connector is the sum
of all costs over these scenarios weighted by the probability of each failure scenario.
We develop a component/connector cost of failure graph [Sherer, 1988] to
estimate the component/connector and scenario cost of failure using annotated UML
sequence diagrams representing the interactions of components and using FFA and FTA
analysis.
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During the execution of a system scenario S x , there are many hazards. These
hazards and their consequences are identified in step 1 using FFA technique. In step 3 we
estimate the probability of each of these hazards. The expected cost of failure of a system
scenario may be estimated by summing the expected uses of the scenario, weighted by
the expected consequences of all hazards that may result from these uses. Using the
probability of usage of the scenario [Katerina, 2003], probability, and cost of these
hazards for this scenario (results from step 1 and step 3) we could estimate the cost of
failure of this scenario using the cost of failure graph as shown in step 4 of the
methodology.
Definitions:
x

Cost i (M ) : The cost of failure of (component/connector) i in a given failure

mode M in a given system scenario S x .
x

p i (M )

: The probability of (component/connector) i being in failure mode

M in a given system scenario S x .
x

p (H )

: The probability of system level hazard H for a given system

scenario S x .
x

Cost ( H )

: Cost of failure for a given system hazard H in a given scenario

Sx
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Total expected cost of failure of (component/connector)

i in a given system

scenario S x is as follows:
j =M

k =H

x

TotalCosti = ∑ p(k ) ∑ x pi ( j)
x

k =1

x

p( S )

j =1

*

x

Costi ( j )

(1)

:Probability of execution of a given scenario S x [Katerina, 2003]

The total expected cost of failure of a given scenario S x is estimated as follows:
k =H

x

TotalCost ( S ) = p( S ) ∑ x p(k )* xCost (k )
x

k =1

5.2.5

(2)

System scenario and components/connectors severity

The cost of failure metrics is a measure of consequences [Kmenta, 2000], and
basing on this the cost of failure could be mapped on a 0.1-1.0 severity rank (cost
severity graph) Figure 5.7.

Figure 5.7 Cost-severity graph
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Using cost-severity graph, we map the expected cost of failure of
component/connector as well as system scenario on a severity rank as shown in Figure
5.7 cost-severity graph. The cost-severity curve depends on the application domain. For
example in Health care, the cost of out-patient care would have a severity rank between
0.1-0.3, whereas in-patient care would have a severity rank between 0.3-0.6, followed by
the cost-severity of intensive care. In general, the cost-severity relationship is nonlinear.
5.3 Case Study

We have selected a case study of a cardiac pacemaker. This case study is
described in chapter 4.
5.3.1

FFA analysis

Figure 5.8 shows system level scenario diagram for the AVI mode of operation.
The system received Programmin_Command event from the programmer actor to
operate in AVI mode. To monitor the heart, the system receives VSense event from the
heart actor and handles it. The system begins pacing the heart by sending signals which
are Pace event to the heart actor. Using the FFA with guide words as explained in section
2.1 we come up with the FFA result in Table 5-2.
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Event Name

Class
failure
Programming_Command Value

VSense

Pace

of Failure

Effects on System Cost of Comments
failure($)
The
A Fault in Heart
is 1000
component
processing
continuously
received the
command
triggered but device
command
routine
is still monitored by
misinterpret
physician,
need
it
immediate fix or
disable.
pace
is 100,000 Some
Omission Timer not set No
component’s
correctly
generated for the
timers does
heart, patient will
not
work
require
intensive
well
care
Heart is always 100,000 Some
Commission Pacing
component’s
paced while patient
hardware
sensor failed
condition requires
device
to sense the
malfunctioning only pacing the
heart.
heart when no pulse
is detected. Heart
operation
is
irregular because it
receives no pacing

Table 5-2 FFA for AVI scenario presented in Figure 5.8

Pacemaker
AVI mode

Heart

Programmer
System Idle
Programming_Command

Value,$10000
Monitor_heart

VSense

Omission,$100000
Pace_heart
Pace

Commission,$100000

Figure 5.8 Scenario Diagram of Pacemaker System in AVI mode (system scenario)
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Communication
Gnome: CG

Atrial: AR

Ventricular: VT

Idle

Off

Heart

Programmer

ToOn
Value, $1000

$1000, 0.09

Programming_Command

$1000, 0.05

Refractory

ToOn

$1000, 0.05

ToAVI
$1000, 0.03

ToAVI

Rfractory

VRefract Done
$100000, 0.03

$100000, 0.05

$100000, 0.05

VSense

Got VSense
Waiting

Sense TimeOut

Omission, $1000
Waiting

$100000, 0.05

$100000,0.1

A Pace Start
$100000, 0.03

$100000, 0.1
Waiting

Waiting
Value, $1000

$100000, 0.05

Ref TimeOut

$1000, 0.01

$1000, 0.05

$1000, 0.05

Pacing

Pace

Pace TimeOut

$100000, 0.03
Pacing

$100000, 0.05

Commission, $1000

$100000, 0.1

A Pace Done
$1000, 0.05

Refractory

Refractory

$1000, 0.02

RefractoryTimeOut
VRefractDone

$1000, 0.1

$1000, 0.03

Figure 5.9 Sequence diagram of the AVI scenario

5.3.2

FMEA analysis

In the sequence diagram of Figure 5.9, the VT component monitors the heart.
When a heartbeat is not sensed, the AR component paces the heart and a refractory period
is then in effect. Table 5-3 is the FMEA table for AR component. Applying FMEA on
every component by tracing states and transitions for every component from its state
diagram, we come up with the FMEA result. Table 5-3 is the result of FMEA for
component AR. Also we apply FMEA for each connector by tracing all messages
transmitted over the connector. Due to space limitations, we show the results concerning
the AR component only.
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5.3.3

FTA analysis

Figure 5.10 shows a fault tree of top event “Commission” of “Pace” hazard as a
function of components/connectors failure modes. FTA step 3 combines the results from
FFA step 1 and FMEA step 2 to map the Commission “Pace“ hazard to its basic failure
modes.

Component Failure Modes
AR

-

-

-

-

Effect on the system

Cause of failure

Cost of
Failure $
not 1000

ToOn Value Error The component will not The component does
work and there is no receive signal from CG
pace
of the heart
VR
stuck
in The component will Connector VT-AR sends a 1000
Refractory State stay in Refractory state wrong message, or component
and there is no pace
AR failes to understand the
message.

The
component The component will The component sensor does 100000
receive GotVSense stay in waiting state not work
but there is no and there is no pace
pace
(Stuck in Waiting
state)
Sense
TimeOut The component in The component sensor does 100000
waiting state, heart not work or value of Sense
Error
operation is irregular Time is wrong
because it receives no
pacing
Heart is always paced There is a problem in the 100000
PaceTimeOut
while patient condition sensor, or the timer does not
Error
(component stuck requires only pacing work
the heart when no pulse
in Pace state)
is detected

Table 5-3 FMEA for AR component
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Top Event
Commission "Pace"

0.65

0.15

0.2
0.1
0.2

Connector VT-AR
Failure

VT Component
Failure

Connector AR-VT
Failure

AR Component
Failure

No pace Start, 0.1
Ref TimeOut
VRefract Error, 0.05
Error, 0.05
Got VSense Error, 0.1
Sense TimeOut Error, 0.1

Stuck in Refractory State, 0.05
Stuck in Waiting State, 0.05
Sense TimeOut Error, 0.1

Stuck in Refractory State, 0.05

Figure 5.10 Commission “Pace” Fault Tree
Using the probabilities of the basic events which are determined in step 2, we
estimate the probability of top level events.
5.3.4

Component/Connector and scenario cost of failure graph

The first level of the AR component cost of failure graph shown in Figure 5.11 is
the top events of all fault trees with their probabilities. Every component/connector could
contribute

to

these

hazards

during

the

execution

of

the

scenario.

The

component/connector contribution to these hazards results from the component/connector
failure modes. To estimate the cost of failure of component/connector during the scenario
we develop the cost of failure graph which relates component/connector failure modes
with the system level hazards. The probability of each failure mode is derived from
domain knowledge and it could be annotated with the sequence diagram.
Using equation (1) we could calculate the estimated cost of failure for every
component/connector. The second level of the cost of failure graph Figure 5.11 is the
failure modes of the AR component associated with the system level hazards (first level
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of the graph). The third level of the graph is the consequence of every failure mode of the
AR component represented by cost.
x

p (H )

System Level hazards
(Fault Trees Top Event)

x

Failure Modes probabilities
of AR Component

P( Value Error
“Programming_Command” )=0.02

Cost
Of Failure
Of AR

P(Commission
“Pace”) = 0.65

P(Omission
“VSence") = 0.15

p i (M )

x

Cost i ( M )

Consequence (Cost) of
AR Failure Modes

AR failed to handle ToOn
P(“failed to handle ToOn”)
=.09

AR “stuck in Refractory” State
P(“stuck in Refractory”) = 0.05

$ 1000
(Regular Care)

$ 1000
(Regular Care)

Sense TimeOut Error
P(“Sense TimeOut Error”) = 0.1
AR “ stuck in Waiting” State
P(“stuck in Waiting”) = 0.05
Sense TimeOut Error
P(“Sense TimeOut” Error) = 0.1
AR “stuck in Pace” State
P(“stuck in Pace”) = 0.03

$ 100000
(Intensive Care)
$ 100000
(Intensive Care)
$ 100000
(Intensive Care)

PaceTimeOut Error
P(“PaceTimeOut Error”) = 0.03

$ 100000
(Intensive Care)

$ 100000
(Intensive Care)

Figure 5.11 cost of failure graph of the AR component
During the intended use of the AVI scenario there are several system level
hazards. The output of the FFA is the list of these possible hazards. Every hazard is
represented by a top event in a single fault tree. As shown in Figure 5.9 the AVI scenario
is used to initialize the system through Programming_Command event (Programmer
actor programs the pacemaker to work in AVI mode), monitor the heart through VScense
event (pacemaker receive signal from Heart actor) and pacing the heart through Pace
event (pacemaker pace the heart). The probability of usage of AVI scenario is given in
chapter 4. Using this probability of usage with the results from step 1 (list of system level
hazards, cost of hazards) and results from step 3 (probability of the system level hazards),
we could estimate the cost of failure of the scenario. To implement this, we use the cost
of failure graph in Figure 5.12 and equation (2). Based on equation (2) the estimated total
cost of failure for the AVI scenario is 23205.8 $, similarly based on equation (1) the
estimated total cost of failure of AR component is 12,184.3 $.
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x

x

p(S)

p(H)

P(value error "Programming_Command" )
= 0.02

P(Commission "Pace")= 0.65

x

Cost(H)

Cost= 1000

Cost = 100000

P(AVI Scenario)=0.29
Estimated cost of failure
of AVI scenario
P(Omission "VSense")= 0.15

Cost = 100000

Figure 5.12 Cost of failure graph of AVI scenario
5.3.5

Components/Connectors and Scenario severity

In the final step of the methodology we use a cost severity-graph (Figure 5.13) to
determine the severity rank for each component/connector as well as the scenario. For the
AVI scenario this is done by extending point A in y axis which gives the total cost of

failure of the scenario, to meet the Cost-Severity curve at point B. We extend point B to
meet the severity scale in the x axis at point C. Point C gives the severity value associated
with the scenario failure. Table 5-4 shows the results of the final step of the methodology
after mapping the cost of failure of each component/connector to severity rank.
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Figure 5.13 cost-severity graph
Component/Connector Name

Severity

Connector CG-AR

0.50

Connector CG-VT

0.50

Connector AR-VT

0.94

Connector VT-AR

0.95

Component CG

0.50

Component AR

0.96

Component VT

0.95

Table 5-4 Severity of each components/connectors in AVI scenario
Next we map the estimated cost of failure of AVI scenario according to severity
rank using a cost-severity graph. Table 5-5 shows the severity of AVI scenario.
Scenario

Severity

AVI

0.96

Table 5-5 AVI scenario severity
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The results from Table 5-4 show that the VT and AR components are components
with the highest severity rank in the AVI scenario. This result is intuitive since these two
components are the most active and the most critical components that directly control the
operation of the heart during the scenario. The CG component, on the other hand,
controls the programming operation, and is monitored by the physician before the device
is put into operation.
Also from Table 5-4, we identify that the connection between the VT and AR
components (AR-VT, VT-AR connectors) are the highest severity connectors. This result
is also intuitive in the context of the pacemaker example, since these connectors deliver
critical messages controlling the heart operation such as sensing and pacing.
Results from Table 5-5 shows that the AVI scenario is a high severity scenario
because it controls the pacing operation of the heart; the worst consequence of failure of
this scenario could lead to patient’s death. Combining these results with the estimated
probability of failure developed in [Katerina, 2003] for software architectural element
(component/connector) as well as system scenario, we have developed an architectural
level risk assessment methodology [Katerina, 2003]. Using the risk methodology, we
could estimate the risk factor for every component/connector, scenario, use case and the
whole software system. This architectural level risk assessment is explored in detail in
[Katerina, 2003].
We have used this methodology to estimate the severity for severity assessment in
the performance risk assessment process measured in [Cortellessa, 2004]. This proposed
methodology for severity assessment is used to assess the severity of software system
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scenarios with requirement failure modes to estimate architectural level requirement risk
assessment [Appukutty, 2005].
5.4 Conclusions and future work

In summary, this research describes a methodology for estimating severity of each
software architectural element (component/connector) at the software architectural level
as well as severity of system scenarios. The methodology is based on dynamic UML
specifications, taking into account the possibility of component/connector cost of failures.
This methodology incorporates the cost of failure to severity rank mapping. FFA is used
as a top down approach based on system scenarios to identify the system level failures,
FMEA is used as a bottom up appraoch based on the detailed view of the system to
identify the possible causes component/connector failures, and FTA correlates the results
of FMEA and FFA. By annotating the hazard analysis results and the cost of failure
information in the UML diagrams, this methodology of estimating severity can be
automated in development environments supporting UML. We used the proposed
methodology for the severity in estimating the performance-based and requirement-based
risk factor of software systems [Appukutty, 2005] [Cortellessa, 2004].
In the future work we will apply this methodology to bigger NASA case studies to
study the validity of this methodology. In the future work we would develop a tool
support which will help domain expert to apply this methodology.
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Chapter 6
Risk Assessment

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we explore the proposed architectural level risk assessment
methodology for assessing risk of architectural element component/connector risk. The
basis for the proposed risk assessment methodology is the use case and scenario diagrams
of the system UML model. The use cases and scenarios of a UML specification model
drive this methodology. We assume that the UML logical architectural model consists of
a use case diagram defining several independent use cases (in future work, we will
explore the dependent use cases), and that each use case is realized with one or more
independent scenarios modeled using sequence diagrams. The proposed methodology
identifies the potential risks in the software architecture, based on the early system
specifications. The architectural specifications are the UML models that are available
early in the software life cycle.
Based on the risk definition [NASA3, 2000 the probability of software failure is
explored in chapter 4.
As shown in chapter 4 the estimation of the probability of failure of software
component/connector is defined as the normalized dynamic metrics. Component
probability of failure is the normalized dynamic complexity and the connector probability
of failure is the normalized dynamic coupling [Katrina, 2003], [Hassan, 2001]. In chapter
5 we showed how to assess the severity of failure for each component/connector in the
software system [Hassan1, 2003], [Hassan2, 2003], [Hassan, 2005]. Combining the two
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factors (probability of failure, severity of failure) we show in this chapter how we can
estimate risk for software component/connector, scenarios, use cases and system. The
estimation of these risk factors is based on the proposed risk assessment methodology.
The proposed risk analysis methodology iterates on the use cases and the
scenarios that realize each use case and determines the component/connector risk factors
for each scenario, as well as the scenarios and use cases risk factors. For each scenario,
the component/connector risk factors are estimated as a product of the dynamic
complexity behavioral specification measured from the UML sequence diagrams (see
chapter 4) and the severity level is estimated using hazard analysis and cost of failure (see
chapter 5). Then, a Markov model [Ajith, 2004] is constructed for each scenario to
determine a scenario risk factor. Further, the use cases and overall system risk factors are
estimated. The outcome of this process is a list of critical scenarios in each use case, a list
of critical use cases, and a list of critical components/connectors for each scenario and
each use case. Also we estimate the system level risk factor.
We proceed in this chapter as follows: Section 6.2 is the proposed risk assessment
methodology, Section 6.3 component/connector risk factor, Section 6.4 describes the
scenario level risk factor model, use case and system level risk factor are described in
Section 6.5, Section 6.6 is the case study, sensitivity analysis is explored in Section 6.7 and
the chapter summary at Section 6.8.
6.2 Risk Assessment Methodology

The proposed methodology is modeled using UML as shown in figure 6.1. Figure
6.1 describes the use case model of the risk assessment methodology. To automate this
risk assessment methodology the UML model is implemented as a prototype tool and is

72

described in chapter 8 [Wang, 2003]. The use case model of the proposed methodology is
described as follows:

Figure 6.1 Overall Use Case UML model of the proposed methodology
The whole process begins with step 1 which consists of collecting information from
UML visual model; this step is explored in details in chapter 8 and the process continues as
described below. Step 2 is explored in chapter 4, step 3 is explored in chapter 5, and the
other steps are explored in this chapter.

1. Collect the information of the software system from UML model (see chapter
8) [Wang, 2003],
2. Estimate dynamic metrics [Hassan, 2001] for each component and connecter of
the software system for a given scenario in a given use case (see chapter 4),
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3. Conduct severity analysis for the software system for a given scenario in a
given use case (see chapter 5) [Hassan1, 2003], [Hassan2, 2003] [Hassan,
2005],
4. Calculate a heuristic risk factor [Ammar, 1997] for each component and
connecter in the software architecture for a given scenario in a given use case
(see section 6.3),
5. Conduct risk factor for each scenario in a given use case based on
component/connector risk factor (see section 6.4) using Markov model
[Katerina, 2003].
6. Conduct risk factor for a each use case in the system based on scenario risk
factor and conduct risk factor for the overall system based on each use case risk
factor (see section 6.5),

The core of the proposed methodology [Katerina, 2003] is defined by the following
algorithm steps:

For each use case
For each scenario
For each component
Measure dynamic complexity
Assign severity based on cost of failure and hazard analysis
Calculate component’s risk factor
For each connector
Measure dynamic coupling
Assign severity based on hazard analysis
Calculate connector’s risk factor
Generate critical component/connector list
Construct Markov model & Calculate transition probabilities
Calculate scenario’s risk factor
Rank the scenarios based on risk factors, Determine critical scenarios list
Calculate use case risk factor
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Rank use cases based on risk factors, Determine critical use case list
Calculate overall system risk factor

The methodology is a top down approach and it is iterative over each level of the
software architecture, starting from use case level, to scenario level and down to basic
component/connector level. The process starts from a use case level, iterates through each
use case and each scenario of that use case. From the scenario level, each component and
connector is analyzed and the corresponding risk factors are estimated. The
component/connector risk factor is the product of the normalized dynamic metrics (see
chapter 4) and the severity of the failure of that component/connector (see chapter 5). The
scenario risk factor is estimated based on the Markov model which is described in [Ajith,
2004]. Use case and system level risk factors are estimated as shown in section 6.5 taking
into consideration the assumption that use cases are independent.
6.3 Component/Connector Risk Factor

Components and connectors are the building blocks of any software architecture.
Hence the architectural risk factor is dependent on the risk factors of the
components/connectors. The assessment of component/connector risk factors is based on
the dynamic UML specifications; these risk factors are referred to as the dynamic
heuristic risk factors [Katerina, 2003], [Ammar, 1997].
The risk factor of component/connector is the product of the probability of failure
of each component/connector and the severity of these failures. The probability of failure
of component/connector is estimated based on dynamic UML specifications (see chapter
4), and the severity of failure is estimated based on hazard analysis techniques and cost of
that failure (see chapter 5).
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6.3.1 Component Risk Factor

For each scenario S x , we calculate heuristic risk factors for each component
participating in the scenario based on the dynamic complexity and severity level. Note
that in general, these values will be different for different scenarios. The risk factor rf i

x

of a component i in scenario S x is defined as
rf i = DOC ix * svt ix
x

6.1

where DOCix (0 ≤ DOCix ≤ 1) is the normalized complexity of the i th component in the
scenario S x (chapter 4), and svt ix (0 ≤ svt ix < 1) is the severity level for the i th
component in the scenario S x (chapter 5).
6.3.2 Connector Risk Factor

The risk factor rf ijx for a connector between components i and j in the scenario
S x is given by
rf ij x = EOCijx ⋅ svtijx

6.2

where EOCijx (0 ≤ EOC ijx ≤ 1) is the normalized coupling for the connector
between i th and j th components in the scenario S x (chapter 4), and svt ijx (0 ≤ svt ijx < 1) is
the severity level for the connector between the i th and the j th components in the
scenario S x (chapter 5).
6.4 Scenarios Risk Factor

This step of the methodology has been presented here for the sake of completeness
and the detailed implementation is presented in [Ajith, 2004]
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We use an analytical modeling approach to derive the risk factor of each scenario.
For this purpose, we generalize the state-based modeling approach previously used for
architecture-based software reliability estimation [Katerina, 2001]. Thus, the software
reliability model first published in [Cheung, 1980] considers only component failures. In
the scenario risk model, we account for both component and connector failures, that is,
we consider both component and connector risk factors. In addition, instead of a single
failure state for the scenario, we consider multiple failure states that represent failure
modes with different severity. This approach allows us to derive not only the overall
scenario risk factor, but also its distribution over different severity classes, which provide
additional insights important for risk analysis.
For example, the two scenarios may have close values of scenario risk factor with
significantly different distributions among severity classes. It can then be inferred that the
scenario with a risk factor distributed among more severe failure classes (e.g., critical and
catastrophic) deserves more attention than the other scenario.
The scenario risk model is developed in two steps. The first step is to build a
control flow graph, which is a direct translation of the scenario diagram. This control
flow graph is constructed using the UML sequence diagrams and describes software
execution behavior with respect to the manner in which different components interact to
achieve the scenario mission. It is assumed that a control flow graph has a single entry (S)
and a single exit node (T) representing the beginning and the termination of the
execution, respectively.
The second step is to build the scenario risk model for that control flow graph,
which is based on the DTMC. The derivation of the DTMC from the control flow graph
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using the UML sequence diagram is the main step in deriving the k-step transition
probability for the absorbing states steady states of the reliability model (for each
sequence diagram) [Ajith, 2004]. The states in the control flow graph represent active
components, while the arcs represent the transfer of control between components (i.e.
connectors). It is further assumed that the transfer of control between components has a
Markov property meaning that, given the knowledge of the component in control at any
given time, the future behavior of the system is conditionally independent of the past
behavior. This assumption allows us to model software execution behavior for scenario
S x with an absorbing Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) with a transition probability

matrix
P x = [ Pijx ] ,

6.3

where Pijx is interpreted as the conditional probability that the program will next
execute component j , given that it has just completed the execution of the component i .
After building the risk model, we solve the Markov chain to estimate scenario risk factor
and risk factor distribution of this scenario.
6.5 Use Cases and Overall System Risk Factors

The risk factor rf k of each use case U k is obtained by averaging the risk factors
of all scenarios S x that are defined for that use case,

rf k =
where rf

x

∑

∀S x ∈ U

rf

x

* P kx

6.4

k

is the risk factor of scenario S x in use case U k and pkx is the probability of

occurrence of scenario S x in the use case U k .
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Similarly, the overall system risk factor is obtained by averaging the use case risk
factors

rf =

∑

∀U

rf k * P k

6.5

k

where rf k and p k are the risk factor and probability of occurrence of the use
case U k . It is obvious from equations (4) and (5) that the use cases and overall system
risk factors depend on the probabilities of scenarios occurrence Pkx in the use case U k and
the probability of use case occurrence Pk . Hence, scenarios (use cases) with high risk
factors but very low probability of occurrence will not contribute significantly to the
overall system risk factor.
6.6 Case study

We have selected a case study of a cardiac pacemaker device to illustrate how our
proposed methodology works. A cardiac pacemaker is an implanted device that assists
cardiac functions when the underlying pathologies lower intrinsic heartbeats low
[Douglass, 1998]. An error in the software operation of the device can cause loss of a
patient’s life. This is an example of a critical real-time application. We use the UML realtime notion to model the pacemaker. The detailed description and UML model of
pacemaker is obtained in chapter 7.
6.6.1 Components and Connector Risk Factor

For this case study, only one scenario was available for each use case. However,
the proposed methodology is more general and supports multiple scenarios defined for
each use case. We will also apply the methodology on HCS case study (see chapter 7)
which supports multiple scenarios for each use case.
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Figure 6.2 shows the sequence diagram of a programming scenario. In this
scenario, the programmer interacts with the RS and CD components to input a set of 8 bits
specifying an operation mode for the pacemaker. This byte is received by the CG
component, which, in turn, sets the operation mode of the AR and VT components to one
of five modes of operation. The other scenarios are shown in chapter 7. Using equations
6.1, 6.2 we could estimate the component/connector risk factors.
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Figure 6.2 Sequence diagram of the programming scenario
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A beneficial outcome of our risk assessment methodology is the ability to identify
a set of most critical components. Figure 6.1, 6.2 presents risk factors of all
components/connectors for different scenarios of the pacemaker case study. In these
figures, the different severity levels are presented by different shades. It is obvious that
VT and AR are the most critical components in the pacemaker case study since they have

high risk factors with catastrophic severity in multiple scenarios. A similar approach can
be used to identify the set of most critical connectors. It is also obvious from Figure 6.4
that connector VT-AR is the most critical connector in this case study since it has a high

Scenario Name

risk factor with catastrophic severity.
RS

CD

Programming

0.05

0.125

AVI

0

0

AAI

0

0

VVI

0

AAT
VVT

Component risk factor
CG
AR

0.15
0.00016
0.00045

0

0

0.300675
0.94905

0.3309515

0.00045
0
0.00025 0.949525
0
0.00025
0
0
0
Table 6.1 components risk factor
0

VT

0

0.94905
0

0.949525
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Figure 6.3 The 3-D bar graph of risk factors of the components Vs. scenarios of the
cardiac pacemaker.

Scenario name

Connector Name

Programming AVI
RS-CD
RS-CG
CD-CG
CG-CD
CG-AR
CG-VT
VT-AR
AR-VT

AAI VVI AAT VVT

0.03125
0.03125
0.09375
0.09375
0.000195 0.5
0.000195
0.5
0.855
0.09215
Table 6.2 Connectors risk factor.
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Figure 6.4 The 3-D bar graph of risk factors of the connectors vs. scenarios of the cardiac
pacemaker.
Figure 6.4 shows a 3-D bar graph of the risk factors of the connectors,
corresponding to their scenarios shaded according to their severity. This is one way of
clearly identifying the most risky components/connectors - the component/connector with
tall bars is the most risky. Another way is to rank the components/connectors according
to their risk factors and severity.
From Figure 6.4, we identify that the connection between the VT, AR components
are the highest risk connectors. This result is intuitively correct in the context of the
pacemaker example since these connectors deliver critical messages controlling heart
operation, such as sensing and pacing.
6.6.2 Scenario Level Risk Factor

We have developed scenario risk models for all scenarios of the pacemaker
example (programming, AVI, AAI, VVI, AAT, and VVT). We will explore in some detail
the AVI scenario. Figure 6.5 shows AVI scenario under the AVI use case. In this scenario,
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the VT component keeps sensing the heart and the AR component paces the heart
whenever a heart beat is not sensed. As in all scenarios, a refractory period is then in
effect after every pace.

Figure 6.5 AVI scenario diagram
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6.6.3 Building the Control Flow Graph from Sequence Diagram

The difference between the sequence diagram and the control flow graph is that
the control flow graph has a single macro state for a component, while in the sequence
diagram we have different active states of a component represented along the
component's object life time. Thus the states in a control flow graph represent the active
components (or, to be more precise, the corresponding active state of that component,
hidden in the representation). The arcs connecting the components (i.e. connectors)
represent a transfer of control between these components. Figure 6.5 shows a sequence
diagram from the AVI scenario of a cardiac pace maker system. The sequence diagram
consists of three main components - Communications Gnome (CG), programmed by the
user to set a particular mode of system operation (in this case AVI mode), Atrial
component (AR) and Ventricular component (VT) (which sense/pace the heart depending
on the mode of operation). The heart shown in the sequence diagram is an external actor,
which is sensed and paced by the pace maker system. The states of the AR and the VT
components - idle, refracting, waiting, pacing are shown along the object life lines. Now
this sequence diagram is converted to a control flow graph Figure 6.6. After obtaining the
control flow graph, we add the probabilities for control transfers from a component to
another (represented as a number along the corresponding connector). These probabilities
correspond to the transition probabilities of the P x matrix. This gives the DTMC of the
software execution behavior for that scenario. Figure 6.6 shows the DTMC built for the
AVI scenario shown in Figure 6.5. It has a single entry state (state S), which is the dummy

start state. An assumption here is that the control transfer between any of the states has
the Markov property: given the knowledge of the component in control at any given time
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the future behavior of the system (or in other words the next transition) is conditionally
independent of the past behavior. We now assign the basic transition probabilities of the
control transfer from component to component, denoted by P x (equation 3) for scenario
Sx [Ajith, 2004]. The matrix Figure 6.7 shows the transition probability matrix PAV I for

the AVI scenario.

Figure 6.6: DTMC for the software execution behavior of the AVI scenario.

Figure 6.7 Transition probability metrics I for the AVI scenario
6.6.4 Building the Risk Model

Instead of a single failure state considered in all existing architecture-based
software reliability models presented in [Katerina, 2001], we consider multiple failure
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states that represent failure modes with different severities. Since severity plays an
important role in risk assessment, we added 4 failure states corresponding to the 4 failure
modes with different severity (see chapter 5). From our severity analysis we have came
up with four classes of severity. Thus, we have n + 1 transient states (n components and
the dummy start state S) and have five absorbing states (i.e. four failure states and one
normal terminating state T). There could be a failure transition from a
component/connector to the failure absorbing state (Figure 6.7) depending on the severity
of the failure of that component/connector. If there is no failure throughout the execution
of the scenario, the control reaches the normal absorbing state (the T state). The failure
states in our methodology are Minor, Marginal, Critical and Catastrophic (see chapter 5).

Figure 6.8 DTMC model for AVI scenario
6.6.5 Solving the Markov Chain

Dotted lines show the failure states of the scenario. Since the severity associated
with component AR and the connector (AR - V T) is the same (Catastrophic), there is only
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one dotted line to represent the failure transition from the AR representing the failures of
component and connector (shown in Figure 6.8. The detailed calculation of the normal
and failure transitions is presented in [Ajith, 2004]. After calculating the transition
probabilities for all components and connectors we solve the risk model of the AVI
scenario shown in Figure 6.8.
The important advantage of this risk assessment methodology is that the risk
factor of the scenario is given as four factors, one for each class of severity. Since
severity plays an important role in risk assessment, this concept of the severity specific
risk factor provides vital meaning of the risk factor rather than a single number. Since the
risk factor (0.7744) of the AVI scenario is distributed as 0, 0.0004, 0 and 0.7740 corresponding to minor, marginal, critical and catastrophic - we know that most of the
AVI scenario risk factor(99.94%) is catastrophic, which is more severe than the risk factor

0.9745 distributed as 0, 0.5002, 0 and 0.4743, which has catastrophic risk(only 48.67%).
We have developed and solve scenario risk models for all scenarios of the
pacemaker example (programming, AVI, AAI, VVI, AAT, and VVT). Table 6.3 shows how
the risk factor of each scenario is distributed among the severity classes, as well as the
overall scenario risk factors. Figure 6.9 presents graphically the information given. The
bar’s shade represents the severity class and the z-axis represents the value of the risk
factor for a given severity class.
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Scenario Name
AVI

AAI

VVI

AAT

VVT

Minor

0.3196

0

0

0

0

0

Marginal

0.1782

Critical

0

Catastrophic

0

0.7740 0.4743 0.4743 0.4747 0.4747

Scenario risk factors

0.4951

0.7744 0.9745 0.9745 0.9748 0.9748

Severity Level

Programming

0.0004 0.5002 0.5002 0.5001 0.5001
0

0

0

0

0

Table 6.3. Distribution of the scenarios risk factors among severity classes.

Table 6.3 shows the risk distribution of the scenarios among the four severity
classes. The columns in the table represent the scenarios and the rows represent the
severity classes. A value in the cell risk m,n where n is the row and m is the column gives
us the risk factor of the scenario m with the severity n. Similarly Figure 6.9 shows a 3-D
bar graph of the scenario risk factors versus the four severity classes. The graph is shaded
according to the distribution of the scenario risk factors among the severity classes (as
shown in the legend). As we can see, the AVI scenario has a high catastrophic risk value.
The other scenarios, like the AAI, VVI, AAT and VVT, have marginal and catastrophic risk
values.
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Figure 6.9 Distribution of the scenarios risk factors among severity classes.

Several observations are made from Figure 6.9. First, all scenarios from the
operational mode have higher risk factors than the programming scenario, which is used
just to set the mode of the pacemaker. Next, it is obvious that knowledge of the
distribution of scenarios risk factors among severity classes provides valuable
information for the risk analysts in addition to the overall scenario risk factor. Thus, the
AVI scenario has the smallest scenario risk factor (0.7744) among the operational

scenarios (AVI, AAI, VVI, AAT, and VVT). However, most of the AVI scenario risk factor
belongs to the catastrophic severity class (0.7740), that is, the AVI scenario has the
highest value of the risk factor in the catastrophic severity class. The risk factors of the
other operational scenarios are distributed almost equally among the marginal and
catastrophic severity classes with the values in catastrophic class significantly smaller
than for the AVI scenario. Programming scenario has the smallest overall scenario risk
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factor (0.4951) distributed only among minor and marginal severity classes, which
means that it is the less critical scenario in the pacemaker case study.
6.6.6 Use case and overall system risk factor

Since in the pacemaker example we considered one scenario per use case, the use
case risk factors are identical to the scenarios risk factors. For the pacemaker example,
according to [Douglass, 1998] the inhibit modes are more frequently used than the
triggered mode. Also, the programming mode is executed significantly less frequently
than the regular usage of the pacemaker in any of its operational modes. Hence, we
assume the probabilities for programming use case and five operational use cases (AVI,
AAI, AAT, VVI, and VVT) (see chapter 7).

Using equations 6.4 and 6.5 and the use case probabilities shown in chapter 7, we
estimate the overall risk factor of the pacemaker 0.9118. The distribution of the overall
system risk factor among severity classes is presented in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.10. The
Table shows the distribution of the system risk factor among the four severity classes and
Figure 6.10 shows the 3d bar cardiac pacemaker system risk distribution among the
severity classes. As we can see most of the cardiac pacemaker system's risk falls in to the
catastrophic severity class. We see that the system risk factor is mostly distributed among
marginal and catastrophic severity class. Moreover, the catastrophic severity class is the
dominant class for this system.
Minor

Marginal

Critical

Catastrophic

Overall system risk
0.0032
0.3520
0
0.5566
factor
Table 6.4 Distribution of the overall risk factor over severity classes
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Figure 6.10 the system risk 3d bar distribution of the cardiac pacemaker.
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis

In the proposed methodology, we use an analytical approach and derive close
form solutions. One of the advantages of this approach is that sensitivity analysis can be
performed

simply

by

plugging

in

different

risk

factor

values

for

the

components/connectors in the close form solutions, which is faster and more effective
than reapplying the algorithmic solution for each set of different parameters as in
[Yacoub, 2002]. Next, we illustrate the sensitivity of the scenarios and overall system risk
factors to components/connectors risk factors.
Figure 6.11 illustrates the variation of the risk factor of the AVI scenario as a
function of changes in risk factors of components active in that scenario. The variation of
the risk factor of VT component introduces the biggest variation of the AVI scenario risk
factor (from 0.65 to 1). This is the case because the VT component is the most active
component in this scenario to sense the heart pulse. On the other side, the variations of
the risk factor of the AR and CG components have less of an effect on the range of the
variation the AVI scenario risk factor. However, the AR component is also critical since it
results in the smaller value of the scenario’s risk factor. Figure 6.13 shows the sensitivity
of the risk factor of the programming scenario to the risk factors of the components active

93

in that scenario. In this case, the variation of the risk factor of the CG component
introduces the biggest variation of the programming scenario risk factor (from 0.175 to
0.979). The variation of the overall system risk factor as a function of components risk
factors is presented in Figure 6.14. It is clear that the risk factors of components CG, VT,
and AR are more likely to affect the overall system risk. This is due to the fact that these
components are active in scenarios that have high execution probabilities. Furthermore,
the variation of the risk factors of components that are active only in the programming
scenario (i.e. RS and CD) has almost no influence on the variation of the overall system
risk factor because the execution probability of the programming scenario is lower than
the execution probabilities of other scenarios. Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12 show the
variation of the AVI scenario risk factors and as a function of components and connectors
risk factors. It is obvious that both AVI scenario risk factor and the overall system risk
factor are the most sensitive to the risk factor of the CG-VT connector.

Figure 6.11 Sensitivity of the AVI scenario risk factor to the risk factor of the
components
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Figure 6.12 Sensitivity of the AVI risk factor to the risk factors of the connectors

Figure 6.13 Sensitivity of the programming scenario risk factor to the risk factors of the
components.
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Figure 6.14 Sensitivity of the overall system risk factor to the risk factors of the
components

Figure 6.15 Sensitivity of the overall risk factor to the risk factors of the connectors
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6.8 Conclusion and Future Work

This chapter presents the architectural-level reliability-based risk assessment
methodology [Katerina, 2003]. In this chapter, we propose a methodology for risk
assessment based on the UML specifications such as use cases and sequence diagrams
that can be used in the early phases the software life cycle. Our methodology uses
dynamic complexity and dynamic coupling metrics obtained from the UML
specifications [Hassan, 2001]. The risk assessment methodology presented in this chapter
considers both component and connector risk factors. It is used for calculating the risk
factors of various components and connectors and estimating a risk factor of scenarios,
use case and system level. We combine severity [Hassan1, 2003], [Hassan2, 2003],
[Hassan, 2005] and complexity (and coupling) metrics to obtain risk factors for the
components (and connectors). It aggregates the risk factors of components/connectors to
calculate risk factors of scenarios among the various severity classes by solving the
Markov chain. Using the scenarios probabilities, the use case risk factors could be
estimated. The system-level risk factor is calculated by averaging the use case risk factors
with their execution probabilities. The risk methodology is applied to the cardiac
pacemaker case study; we have also applied it to the HCS case study (see chapter 7).
Since the methodology is entirely analytical and provides a closed form solution, it is
very suitable for sensitivity analysis and automation. In fact, a prototype of the risk
assessment tool written in JAVA which reads the embedded UML information from
Rational Rose, and calculates the various risk factors has already been developed (see
chapter 9) [Wang, 2003].
In summary our methodology consists of the following:
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(1) Accurate and more efficient methods to estimate risk factors on different levels and
(2) Additional information useful for risk analysis.
(3) Estimation of overall system risk factor
(4) Estimation of scenarios and use cases risk factors which enable us to focus on the
high-risk scenarios and uses cases even though they may be rarely used and therefore not
contributing significantly to the overall system risk factor.
(5) Estimation of the distribution of the scenarios/use cases/system risk factors over
different severity classes which allow us to make a list of critical scenarios in each use
case, as well as a list of critical use cases in the system.
(6) Finally, we identify a list of critical components and connectors that has high risk
values in high severity classes.
Our future work is focused on generalization of the methodology presented in this
chapter. We will consider different kinds of dependencies that might be present in the
UML use case diagrams (i.e considers the various relationships between the use cases)
and the way to derive their risk factors. Another direction of our future research is the
development of performance, maintainability based risk assessment methodology.
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Chapter 7
Case Studies

7.1 Command and Control System (CCS)

The case study we use to applay our methodology is a large command and control
system that is used in a life-critical, mission-critical application. This system was
modeled using the Rational Rose Realtime CASE tool [Rose, 2001]. The CCS is a
Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI) that provides the following functions:
This CCS system is a complex system with operations setting controller, fault recovery
procedures, and pump control functionalities. The CCS is responsible for providing
overall management of pumps as well as performing the necessary monitoring and
response to sensors data. Also, it is responsible for performing automated startup, and
controlling Thermal System reconfigurations. During each execution cycle, a check is
performed for incoming commands. Received commands are validated in the same
execution cycle. Mode change commands, which will reconfigure the Internal Thermal
System, are also accepted from other components of CCS to compensate for system
component failures or coolant leaks. A failure recovery system detects failure conditions
and performs recovery operations in response to the detected failures. Failure conditions
include combinations of Pump failures and Shutoff Valve failures. The system has a
hierarchical architecture. The top-level software architecture of this system is shown in
use case diagram Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1 use case diagram of the CCS
Every use case is mapped to one scenario. Table 7.1 shows the probability of
execution of each scenario.
Use case (Scenario)
S_LT
D_LT
MT
S_MT
D_MT
R_B_P
Dua
LT
Monitor

Probability
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.92

Table 7-1 The probabilities of the scenarios of the CCS
Figure 7.2 shows the Dua sequence diagram. This sequence diagram is an
implementation of the Dua use case.
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/ sR1 : SCITCS

/ fR1 : FRITCS

/ pLR1
: PFMC_LT

/ pMR1
: PFMC_MT

/ schR1
: Schedular

state_Idle

state_Stand_By

State_X

State_X

Processing_Cycle

/ aR1
: Appl_command_queue

/ n1R1
: N3_1_Data_Access

/ n2R1
: N3_2_Data_Access

State_X

State_X

Open

Open

ITCS_Command

1: NotAvailable : _1HZ_Processing (void)
2: NotAvailable : Get_Function_Command (void)

Trans_To_Dua

Processing_Cycle

3: NotAvailable : Startup (void)

Non_ITCS_Commad

4: NotAvailable : Armed_PFMC_New_Motor_Speed (int 1...)
5: NotAvailable : Startup (void)
6: NotAvailable : Armed_PFMC_New_Motor_Speed (int 1...)
Trans_TO_Dua
5: NotAvailable : PPA_Speed_Feedback (int 0)
6: NotAvailable : Open_Shut_Off_Valve (void)
trans_TO_Dual
7: NotAvailable : PPA_Speed_Feedback (int 0)
8: NotAvailable : Open_Shut_Off_Valve (void)
Trans_TO_Dual
7: NotAvailable : Valve_Open (void)
8: NotAvailable : Armed_PFMC_New_Motor_Speed (int 2...)
Trans_TO_Dual
9: NotAvailable : Valve_Open (void)
10: NotAvailable : Armed_PFMC_New_Motor_Speed (int 2...)
Trans_TO_Dual
9: NotAvailable : PPA_Speed_Feedback (int 1)
Dual_Tans

Operating

11: NotAvailable : PPA_Speed_Feedback (int 1)
12: NotAvailable : SFCA_Clear_Inhibit (void)
13: NotAvailable : SFCA_Clear_Inhibit (void)
Operating
Trans_TO_Dual

2: NotAvailable : _1HZ_Processing (void)

Clear_Inhibit

3: NotAvailable : Trans_Dual (int 3)

Dual

Clear_Inhibit

Dua_Mode

Figure 7.2 Dua sequence diagram
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Table 7-2 shows the risk factor and severity of each component in the Dau
scenario. From this table we can identify that component pFMC_LTR1 is the most sever
component

scenario
component
fRITCSR1
Dua
pFMC_MTR1

appl_command_queueR1
sCITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
pFMC_LTR1
schedularR1

complexity severity Risk Factor
0.0625
0.75 0.046875
0.125
0.75
0.09375

0.0625
0.375
0.0625
0.0625
0.125
0.125

0.95
0.95
0.5
0.75
0.75
0.25

0.059375
0.35625
0.03125
0.046875
0.09375
0.03125

Table 7-2 Dua Scenario components risk factor
The other sequences diagrams of this case study and the detailed results are
shown in Appendix B.
7.1.1 CCS Scenarios risk factors

Table 7-3 shows the distribution of risk factor of the scenarios among severity
classes.
Minor

Marginal Critical Catastrophic Risk Factor
S_LT
0 0.001423 0.224649 0.084604 0.310676
D_LT
0.095979
0 0.06582
0.31299 0.474789
MT
0 0.020362 0.208994 0.386209 0.615565
S_MT
0 0.00218 0.143619 0.501907 0.647706
D_MT
0.025382
0 0.413158 0.000468 0.439008
R_B_P
0.19015 0.043739
0 0.039977 0.273866
Dua
0 0.140222 0.000542
0.35643 0.497194
LT
0.286245 0.055764
0
0 0.342009
Single_LT
0 0.001423 0.224649 0.084604 0.310676
Monitor
0.341113 0.201009 0.542122
Table 7-3 The risk factor for every scenario
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Table 7-3 shows that scenario S_MT has total risk factor 0.647706 and it has
0.501907 catastrophic risk factor. It looks that this is the most critical scenario in the
system.
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Figure 7.3 the 3D-bar graph for the distribution of scenarios risk factor among severity
classes.
7.1.2 CCS System Risk Factor

Table 7-4 shows the distribution of the system risk factor between the four
severity classes. It shows also from Figure 7.4 that the risk of failure of the system is
critical. The system has 0.537867 total risk factor and most of this risk factor is critical
which is 0.326638.

System

Minor Marginal Critical Catastrophic Risk Factor
0.005978 0.002651 0.326638
0.2026
0.537867

Table 7.4 system risk factor and the distribution of the risk factor
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Figure 7.4 3D-bar of risk factor distribution for the HCS system

In this section and also in the section 7.3 we show the results of applying the
severity analysis methodology on other case studies.

7.2 Remote Transmission System (RTS)
The RTS involves a controller and a remote system. The controller sends
commands and receives data from the remote system. Transmission takes place in two
different modes. Figure 7.5 shows the Use case view of the system. The actor “Operator”
represents the operator of the controller. The Remote system is shown as an actor as well.
The two different transmission modes are represented as use cases “TransmitA” and
“TransmitB”. The “Handle Transmission Failure” is used whenever a transmission fails.
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Handl e T ransmi ssion Fai lure

<<incl ude>>

<<incl ude>>

Transmi tA

Operator

RemoteSystem

Transmi tB

Figure 7.5 Use case diagram for RTS case study
Figure 7.6 gives the system level sequence diagram for one of the scenarios of
“TransmitB” use case. Ac1 is an external actor that stores the current status of the remote
system. Based on the status, a command is sent to the remote system. S1, S2 and S3
represent the system states.
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System

Ac1

RemoteSystem
S1
Status

S2
Transmit

S3

Figure 7.6 System level sequence diagram of TransmitB use case
The following table shows the list of events (signals/messages) sent between the
System and the external actors. The FFA guidewords are applied to these external events.
Since we only consider the performance related failures [Cortellessa, 2005], we apply
only the “LATE” guideword. The FFA table obtained is shown in Table 7-6.
Event NameActor sends or receives this event

Status
Transmit

From A1 to system
From system to Remote System
Table 7-5 External events
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Event Guide-word

Failure

Effect

Cost

Severity

Status

Late

A1 takes longer time The input cannot be
Mission 0.95
to send the status
handled at the right time Loss

Transmit

Late

Commands don’t
Commands cannot be
reach the remote
transmitted in time
system at proper time

Mission 0.95
Loss

Table 7-6 FFA Table for TransmitB scenario
This results show the severity analysis for the system scenario level.
7.3 E-Commerce system

The e-commerce application allows customers and suppliers to interact with each
other over the Internet. In this type of applications long response times may easily lead
customer to change the supplier, with consequent damages such as loss of money and
market. The severity of performance failures (i.e., violations of performance
requirements) depends on the type of failure and usually is different for different types of
failures.
The e-commerce system allows a customer to browse through the various catalogs
provided by the suppliers, select the item to be purchased, and place the order. The order
is validated by checking that the customer has a contract with the supplier and one or
more bank accounts through which payments can be made. The supplier checks for the
availability of the product, and if available, ships the product. After received the product,
the customer sends back an acknowledgement. Finally, the invoice is processed by
electronically transferring funds from the customer’s bank account to the supplier’s bank
account. The Use case model of the e-commerce application is shown in Figure 7.7.
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Process Delivery order
Browse Catalog

Confirm Shipment

Customer

Supplier

Place Requisition
Send Invoice

Bank
Confirm Delivery

Figure 7.7 Use case view of e-commerce system
For illustration purposes, we consider the Place Requisition scenario, where the
customer places an order and receives a receipt of the order. The Sequence diagram is
shown in Figure 7.8.
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<<actor>>
Customer

CustomerInterface

CustomerAgent

RequisitionAgent

<<database>>
ContractsServer

<<database>>
FundsServer

<<database>>
RequisitionServer

DeliveryOrderAgent

<<database>>
OrdersServer

1: CustomerInput
CI1
2: CustomerRequest
CA3
3: RequisitionRequest
RA1
4: ContractQuery
CTS1
5: AvailableContracts
RA2
6: ReserveFunds
7: FundsReserved
RA3

FS1

8: RequisitionData
RS1

RA4
9: RequisitionStatus
CA4
CA5

10: PurchaseRequest
DOA1

12: RequisitionStatus

11: OrderData

CI3

OS1

13: RequisitionOutput

Figure 7.8 Sequence Diagram for the Place Requisition scenario

The system level sequence diagram is shown in Figure 7.8. It shows the messages
that are exchanged between the system and the external actors involved. The FFA
guidewords are applied to these external events Figure 7.9. Since we consider only the
performance risk for this case study, we apply only the “LATE” guideword.
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Sys tem

Customer
Cus tomerInput

Process

Requis ition Output

Figure 7.9 System level sequence diagram for Place Requisition scenario
After we apply the FFA we come up with the FFA Table 7-7, which show the
severity of failure of the scenario [Cortellessa, 2005] Figure 7.9.

Scenario

Event

Guide
words

Failure

Place
Requisition

Customer
input

Late

n/a

Request
output

Late

The confirmation
message for the
order placed takes
a long time to be
displayed to the
customer

Effect

•

Customer’s
time is
wasted.

•

The
customer
gets
impatient.

•

The
customer
might cancel
the order.

•

The
customer
might not
order again.

Cost

Severity

Mission
loss
0.95

Table 7-7 FFA Table for Place Requisition scenario
This table shows the results of applying the severity methodology for system
scenario level and the table shows the FFA output.
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Chapter 8

Validation Criterion

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter we explore two ways to validate the proposed risk methodology
and the proposed severity assessment methodology. First we use validation criteria
similar to criteria explored in [Elemam, 2000] (section 8.2). Second we compare the
results of risk factors predicted using the proposed methodology and risk factors resulted
from the simulation model [Yacoub, 2002] and we looking for correlation (Section 8.3).
And in section 8.4 we validate the severity analysis methodology using the validation
criteria proposed in section 8.2.
We proceed in this chapter as follows: Section 8.1 introduction, Section 8.2 is the
proposed validation criteria, Section 8.3 is validation by comparison, and Section 8.4 is
the proposed severity methodology validation. We conclude with Section 8.5.
8.2 Validation criterion

To validate the proposed risk model, we use criteria that are based on the analysis
of categorical data [Kohavi, 1998], [Briand, 2000], [Lanubile, 1997]. In our validation,
we assume that we have two variables, real risk and predicted risk, with only two discrete
values, low and high risk. We restrict ourselves to binary risk classes: High and Low.
Thus the data can be represented by a two-dimensional table, shown in Table 8.1, with
one row for each level of the variable real risk and one column for each level of the
variable predicted risk. In the following section we will explain the notations used.
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8.2 1 Confusion matrix

A commonly used notation for presenting risk data for evaluation is the Confusion
matrix, Table 8.1 [Kohavi, 1998], [Briand, 2000]. This matrix contains information about
actual risk done by the simulation model and predicted risk done by the proposed model.
Such a confusion matrix also appears frequently in the medical sciences in the context of
evaluating diagnostic tests; for example, see [Gordis, 1996].
The data can be represented by a two-dimensional table [Elemam, 2000] Table 81. With rows for real risk (low, high) and columns for predicted risk (low, high). In our
context, the first row contains low risk components, while the second row contains high
risk components. The first column contains components that the models classify as low
risk, while the second column contains components classified as high risk.
Predicted Risky
Components
Low

Real Risky
Components

Low
High

n11
n21
N+1

High

n12

N1+

n22

N2+

N+2

N

Table 8-1 Confusion matrix.
8.2.2 Definition of the terms used in the confusion matrix

n11

The number of components which have low risk factor; it is predicted as having

low risk factor.
n12

The number of components which have low risk factor; it is predicted as having

high risk factor.
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n21

The number of components which have high risk factor; it is predicted as having
low risk factor.

n22

The number of components which have high risk factor; it is predicted as having
high risk factor.

N1+

Number of low risk factor components.

N 2+

Number of high risk factor components.

N +1

The number of components predicted as Low risk

N +2

The number of components predicted as High risk

The number of all components is
N = N1+ + N 2+ = N +1 + N +2

8.1

Having data represented by a confusion matrix, we could measure the validity of
the proposed model. To study the predictive validity of the proposed model we use the
evaluation criteria explained in the following section.
A number of different measures are used to evaluate binary classifiers in software
engineering research [Almeida, 1998], [Lanubile, 1997]. An intuitively obvious way to
evaluate the overall “goodness” of a classifier is to calculate the proportion of correct
classifications. The proportion correct has been used in a number of previous studies to
evaluate classifiers [Elemam, 2000], [Almeida, 1998], [Lanubile, 1997], [Schneidewind,
1994]. The misclassification rate quality achieved [Lanubile, 1997] is also used in
engineering research as a criteria for evaluating predictive models. Different authors use
different measures; they also often report multiple measures in a single study [Elemam,
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2001b]. We recommend the use of multiple measures for a single study as it may be
useful for getting an overall intuitive picture of prediction performance.
In the following section, we will explain the proposed criteria that could be used
to evaluate the proposed risk model.
8.2.3 Proportion correct

Most authors proposed the proportion correct value, for example [Almeida, 1998],
[Lanubile, 1997], [Schneidewind, 1994]. Porter in [Porter, 1993], called the proportion
correct value as “correctness value”. This is an intuitively interesting measure of
prediction performance since it is easy to interpret and is defined as:
A=

n11 + n22
N

8.2

It gives the ratio of components that the model correctly predicts.
8.2.4 Misclassification rate

This evaluative measure is used in a number of different studies, such as
[Khoshgoftaar, 1995a], [ [Koshgoftaar, 1996b], [Elemam, 2001b], [Khoshgoftaar, 1997].
Two types of errors could take place using binary classifiers. A Type 1 error is made
when a high risk component is classified as low risk, while a Type 2 is made when a low
risk component is classified as high risk. It is desirable to have both types of error be
small. However, since the two types of errors are not independent, software engineering
managers should consider their different implications. As a result of a Type 1 error, an
actual high risk component could pass quality control. This would cause the release of a
lower quality product and more fix effort when a failure takes place. As a result of a Type
2 error, an actual low risk component will receive more testing and inspection effort than
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needed. Type 1 and Type 2 errors are a function of n21 and n12 . We use the following
measures of misclassification [Schneidewind, 1994], [El-Emam, 1999c].
The Type 1 misclassification rate is 1 − f , and the Type 2 misclassification rate is
1 − S [Khoshgoftaar, 1999], [Taghi, 1997]. Where f is the specificity of the model, it is

the proportion of low risk components that have been correctly classified as low risk
components, [Almeida, 1998], [El-Emam, 1999c], and it is defined as follows:
f =

n11
n11 + n12

8.3

Also, S is the sensitivity of the model, and is the proportion of high risk
components that have been correctly classified as high risk components [Briand, 1993a],
[Porter, 1990], and is defined as follows:

S=

n22
n21 + n22

8.4

Some authors, such as [El-Emam, 2000] report the sensitivity and specificity
values directly as measures. Ideally, both the sensitivity and specificity should be high. A
low specificity means that there are many low risk components that are classified as high
risk. Therefore, the organization would be wasting resources reinspecting or focusing
additional testing effort on these components. A low sensitivity means that there are
many high risk components that are classified as low risk. Therefore, the organization
would be passing high risk components to subsequent phases. In both cases the
consequences may be expensive field failures or costly defect correction later in the life
cycle.
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8.2.5 Quality achieved

We are interested in measuring how effective the model is in terms of the quality
achieved after the components classified as high risk have undergone an extra verification
activity. If all the high risk components are properly classified, all mitigation actions will
take place by extra verification, and perfect quality will be achieved. However, quality
will be degraded with each high risk component that is not identified. We could measure
the criterion of achieved quality using the COmpleteness (CO) measure [Briand, 1993]
which is the percentage of high risk components that have been actually classified as such
by the model.
 CO =

n 22
N 2+

(5)

Based on the time frame available and also the availability of data we will use the
simulation model to evaluate the proposed model. We will compare the results which the
proposed model predicts with the results of the simulation of the Pace maker case study.
Finally we will use the simulation model results to validate the proposed model.
8.3 Pacemaker case study

To evaluate our proposed risk model, the proposed evaluation criteria are applied
on the results for system level component and connector risk factors.
8.3.1 Confusion matrix for components

Table 8-2 shows the confusion matrix representing results from system level
component risk factor. The predicted risk in the columns represents the result from the
proposed model. The Real risk in the rows represents the simulation model results. The
value 3 corresponding to the “Low” row and “Low” column (cell n11) shows that three
components that were predicted to be low risk components by our methodology prove to
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be low risk components in the simulation results as well. Similarly the value in cell n22
corresponding to the “High” row and “High” column shows that two components that
were predicted to be high risk by our proposed methodology prove to be high risk
components in the simulation results.
Predicted Risk
Components
set
Low

Real Risk
Components
set

Low
High

High

3
0
3

0

3
2

2
2

5

Table 8-2 the confusion matrix for the results System Level Component Risk Factor

Proportion Correct

The following calculation shows the proportion of correct predictions obtained
from our methodology when compared to the simulation results. The result is 1, which
means that our methodology predicted results are 100% identical to the simulation model
results for the pace maker case study. The result might not be this accurate for other case
studies, which involve many more components than the pace maker example.

A=

n11 + n22
= 5/5 = 1
N

Misclassification rate

The following shows the calculation of the misclassification rate. There are 0
misclassifications in Type 1 and Type 2.

f =

n11
= 3/(3+0) =1
n11 + n12

117

The Type 1 misclassification rate is 1 − f

= 1-1 = 0

Type 2 misclassification rate is 1 − S = 1 – 1 = 0, where
S =

= 2/(0+2) = 1

n 22
n 21 + n 22

Quality achieved

The quality achieved is calculated as follows:
CO =

= 2/2 = 1

n 22
N 2+

8.3.2 Confusion matrix for connectors

The confusion matrix for system level connector risk factors is shown in Table 83. The cell n12 shows that two connectors that were predicted as high risk were actually
low risk connectors from the simulation results. Similarly, the cell N21 shows that one
connector that was predicted as high risk by our methodology was actually a low risk
connector in the simulation results.
Predicted Risk
Connectors
set
Low

Real Risk
Components
set

Low

High

4

High

2
1

5

6
2

1
3

8

Table 8-3 Confusion matrix for connectors
The proportion of correct predictions and the misclassifications are calculated
as in the previous section. The quality achieved is 0.5.
Proportion Correct

A=

n11 + n22
= 5/8 = 0.625
N
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Misclassification rate

f =
The Type 1 misclassification rate

n11
= 4/(4+2) =0.667
n11 + n12

1− f

= 1-1 = 0.333

Type 2 misclassification rate is 1 − S = 1 – 0.5 = 0.5
n22
S=
= 1/(1+1) = 0.5
n21 + n22
Quality achieved
n
CO = 22 = 1/2 = 0.5
N 2+
The model does not work well for the prediction of connector risk, and quality
achieved, while Type 2 misclassification rate is poor.
8.4 Validation by comparing the simulation and predicted results

Table 8-4 shows the comparison between the predicted system level risk factors
for the software components of Pace maker example, obtained from our proposed
methodology and the results from the simulation model published by Yacoub et al
[Yacoub, 2002]. The comparison is graphically represented in Figure 8.1. The results
strongly correlate with each other and the correlation factor is 0.997.
Component
Simulation Model Result
Proposed model Result

RS
CD
0.0005
0.002

0.00325
0.002375
Correlation
0.99735215

CG

AR
0.0025
0.0034

VT
0.95 0.91485
0.95
0.817

Table 8-4 System Level Component Risk Factor and correlation
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System Level Component Risk Factor
1
Risk Factors

0.8
0.6

Simulation Model
Result

0.4

Proposed model
Result

0.2
0
RS

CD

CG

AR

VT

Components

Figure 8.1 System Level Component Risk Factor
8.4.1 System Level Connector Risk Factor

Table 8-5 shows the comparison of predicted software connector risk factors at
system level with the simulation model results by Yacoub et al [Yacoub 2002] for Pace
maker case study. The comparison is graphically represented in Figure 8.2. These results
show a low correlation. The correlation factor is 0.379. The simulation model considers
the heart and the programmer as components, whereas in our proposed methodology,
these entities are considered as external actors. Therefore, the connectors that involve the
heart or the programmer are not considered in our case and hence could not be compared
with the simulation results. This could be an apparent reason for the low correlation.
Connector
RS-CD RS-CG CD-CG CG-CD CG-ARCG-VTAR-VTVT-AR
Simulation Model Result 0.00035 0.00035 0.00075 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 0.2375 0.2565
Proposed model Result 0.0008930.000893 0.0026750.002675
0.5
0.5 0.0763 0.708
Correlation
0.378665

Table 8-5 System Level Connector Risk Factor and correlation
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Connector Risk Factor
1

Risk Factor

0.8

Simulation
Model Result
Proposed

0.6
0.4
0.2
0
RS-CD RS-CG CD-CG CG-CD CG-AR CG-VT AR-VT VT-AR
Connector

Figure 8.2 System Level Connector Risk Factor
8.4.2 Scenario Level component risk factor

Tables 8-6 to 8-11 show the comparison of our results with the simulation model
results for scenario level component risk factor for each scenario in the Pace maker case
study. Figure 8.3 to Figure 8.9 graphically represent these results. The results have a high
correlation factor. The correlation values are given in the corresponding tables.
Programming scenario
Component
RS
CD
Simulation Model Result0.02075 0.1685
Proposed model Result

0.05

CG ARVT
0.1215 0 0

0.125
0.15 0 0
Correlation
0.925109675

Table 8-6 Programming scenario Components Risk Factor
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Programming Scenario components risk Factor
0.3

Risk Factor

0.25
0.2

Simulation Model
Result
Proposed model

0.15
0.1
0.05
0
RS

CD

CG

AR

VT

Components

Figure 8.3 Programming scenario Components Risk Factor
AVI Scenario
Component
RSCD
Simulation Model Result 0
0
Proposed model Result

0

CG
0

AR
VT
0.5054 0.4446

0
0.000160.300680.33095
Correlation
0.98138

Table 8-7 AVI scenario Components Risk Factor

Risk Factor

AVI com ponents Risk Factor
0.6
0.5
0.4

Simulation Model
Result

0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Proposed model
Result
RS

CD

CG

AR

VT

Com pone nts

Figure 8.4 AVI scenario Components Risk Factor
AAI scenario
Component
RSCD
Simulation Model Result 0
0
Proposed model Result

0

CG
0

AR

VT
0.95 0

0
0.000450.94905 0
Correlation
1

Table 8-8 AAI scenario Components Risk Factor
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1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Simulation Model
Result
Proposed model
Result

RS

CD

CG

AR

VT

Figure 8.5 AAI scenario Components Risk Factor
VVI scenario component risk factor
Component
RSCDCG
Simulation Model Result 0 0
0
Proposed model Result

0 0

ARVT
0
0.95

0.00045
00.94905
Correlation
1

Table 8-9 VVI scenario Components Risk Factor
VVI scenario component Risk Factor

Risk Factor

1

Simulation Model Result
Proposed model Result

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
RS

CD

CG

AR

VT

Com ponent

Figure 8.6 VVI scenario Components Risk Factor
VVT scenario
Component
RSCD
Simulation Model Result 0
0
Proposed model Result

0

CG
0

ARVT
0 0.95

0
0.00025 00.949
Corrilation
0.999999974

Table 8-10 VVT scenario Components Risk Factor
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VVT scenario component risk factor

Risk Factor

1
0.8

Simulation Model
Result
Proposed model Result

0.6
0.4
0.2
0
RS

CD

CG

AR

VT

Component

Figure 8.7 VVT scenario Components Risk Factor
AAT Scenario
Component
RSCDCG
Simulation Model Result 0 0
0
Proposed model Result

0 0

AR VT
0.95 0

0.00025 0.949 0
Correlation
1

Table 8-11 AAT scenario Components Risk Factor
AAT scenario component risk factor

Risk Factor

1
0.8
0.6

Simulation Model Result

0.4

Proposed model Result

0.2
0
RS

CD

CG

AR

Com pone nt

Figure 8.8 AAT Scenario Components Risk Factor

8.5 Severity methodology validation.

To validate this methodology we run fault injection experiment [Abdelmoez, 2004].
Fault injection experiment explores the behavior of the system in a case of failure
resulting from an injected fault based on fault model.
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The experiment shows that some failures in components/connectors considered in
the domain expert fault tree are unrealistic. On the other hand, other unaccounted failures
can be discovered in the experiment. Based on the results of the experment we can
validate the proposed severity methodology.
We used a CCS case study (chapter 7) to apply the methodology and running
experiment. We used the results estimated from the methodology (chapter 5) and from
the experiment [Abdelmoez, 2004] with the previous validation criteria to validate the
proposed severity methodology. We found some components/connectors considered to be
contributing to certain failures by domain expert turned out not to have any role.
Furthermore, Fault injection can discover some failures in components/ connectors that
could not be discovered by the domain expert analysis.
8.5.1 Fault injection analysis
This step has been presented here for the sake of completeness and the detailed implementation is
presented in [Abdelmoez, 2004].

In order to verify and validate the functionality of the command and control system,
we use the environment, which consists of the system, the Fault-Generator and the
Observer [Abdelmoez, 2004]. We put the system under investigation while faults being
injected by using the Fault Generator (and the consequences are monitored through the
Observer). The simulation is exercising all recoverable faults that the system can go
through and react in the way specified in the requirements. We apply that fault injection
methodology using Rose Real Time [Gomaa, 2000] simulation environment and log
component states in order to observe the system response to the injected fault. Based on
the consequences of resulting changes in component states on the system mission, we

125

analysis the log of the simulation to establish the fault tree for every
component/connector with failures associated with the injected fault.
This analysis is being conducted for the system components and using various types
faults according to the proposed fault model.

/ c o m m a n d _ a n d _ c o n tro lR 1
: C o m m a n d _ a n d _ c o n tro l
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/ pump1R 1
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1 . 7 : A rm M o t o r ( F i n a l S p e e d )
1 . 6 . 1 : V a l v e O pe n
1 .8 : A rm M ot or ( Fi na l S p ee d )
1 . 7 . 1 : S p e e d F e e d b a c k (S p e e d )

1 .8 .1 : S pe e d F e ed b a ck ( S p ee d )
1 .9 : C l e a r I n h i b i t
1 .1 0 : C l e a r In h i b i t

Figure 8.9 “Mode setting” system sequence
diagram

Our objective is to come up with a study of the effects of failures on a componentby-component and a connector-by-connector basis. We inject faults (one at a time) into
components and we run the simulator to study effects of a failure. Similarly, we inject
faults (one at a time) into connectors and run the simulator to study the effects of a
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failure. Figure 8.10 shows the fault tree of the external event “Mode setting” (Figure 8.9)
which is a result of the step 3 of the proposed methodology. During this scenario (Figure
8.10) components (C1 to C10) interact to achieve the mode setting action. If we injected
fault to that event (“Mode Setting”) it will lead to system failure. This failure of the
system mission could happen if the system received “Mode setting” in error. The
resulting fault tree after injected fault is shown in Figure 4 without doted lines.
"Operator Command "
"VALUE" Error

0.01

0.002

0.001
C1-C10

C10

C10-C1

0.001
Get command from
Q Error

0.001
0.002

0.002

0.002

0.001

0.002

C9

C9-C1

C1
0.002

0.002

Signal Transmitted
In Error
Process Cycle
Error

0.002
0.001

0.001
0.001
No
Command

Not reach
"Trans_To_Dual"
Mode

0.001
Stuck in
Idle

No Processing
Signal

Command
Error

Figure 8.10 “Mode Setting” Command” event fault
tree

As described above Figure 8.10 shows the fault tree resulting from the analysis
(chapter 5 methodology step 3). The dotted lines are the branches of the tree for failures
that the fault injection experiment showed to be unrealistic. Comparing the severity
estimated based on the two fault tree structures, we could validate the severity assessment
methodology as discussed in the following section.
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8.5.2 Severity Methodology Validation

The fault tree output is used to estimate the cost of failure of any component or
connector. We assume for every scenario that failure of any component or connector
could lead to the failure of the system. By injecting fault and running the experiment we
could estimate the exact contribution of components or connectors in the system failure
during the execution of a specific scenario by means of exact fault tree (Figure 8.10
without doted lines). This will lead to a fault tree different from the one estimated from
step 3 of the methodology (Figure 4) for every component/connector. This leads to
different cost of failure than the one estimated from step 4 of the methodology. To
evaluate the proposed severity methodology we use the previous criteria. In our
validation process we assume that two variables, real severity (estimated based on the
simulation model) and predicted severity (estimated from the proposed methodology), for
all four severity categories with only two discrete values. Table 8-12 shows confusion
matrix.
Predicted Severity
Critical

Real Severity
(Simulation
results)

Critical
Catastrophic

Catastrophic
17

16

1

0

18

18

16

19

35

Table 8-12 The confusion matrix for components of the CCS case study.

The proportion of correct predictions and the misclassifications are calculated as
in the previous section.

Proportion Correct
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A=

n11 + n22
= (16+18)/35 = 0.97
N

Misclassification rate

n11
= 16/(16+1) =0.94
n11 + n12
The Type 1 misclassification rate is
f =

1− f

= 1-0.94 = 0.06

Type 2 misclassification rate is 1 − S =

n22
= 18/(0+18) = 1
n21 + n22
Type 2 misclassification rate = 1 − S = 1-1 = 0
S=

The model works well for the prediction of catastrophic severity, and also for
critical severity prediction, the model predict all the catastrophic severity but it predicts
critical severity components by error factor 0.06 which is not bad.
8.6 Conclusion

As shown in this chapter we compared the result from the proposed methodology
with the simulation results [Yacoub, 2003]. We conclude that the result of the proposed
methodology gives high correlation for the component risk factor (scenario level or
system level). The risk factor of connectors (scenario and system level) gives poor
correlation.
After that we used three measures to evaluate the proposed risk technique. These
measures are based on confusion matrix [Briand, 2000]. The risk model is considered as a
good predictor for components risk factor but still need many case studies to draw a final
conclusion. It is not considered to be a good predictor for a connector’s risk factor and it
needs many case studies before a final conclusion can be drawn.
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Chapter 9
Architecture-level Risk Assessment Tool

9.1 Introduction

There is an increasing need for a tool that can be used to track the quality of a
software product during the software design phase.
The product of the software development phases should be measurable in order to
find and control its errors. Unfortunately, quality assurance methods with extensive
automated support only apply in phases that are too late in the software life cycle to be
really cost-effective. Many important product quality characteristics, such as
performance, maintainability and risk assessment cannot be added late in the lifecycle,
hence early warnings of poor quality expectation would be very useful to allow for early
corrective measures. To automate and implement the proposed risk assessment
methodology (chapter 6) we propose a prototype tool. We proceed in this chapter as
follows:
Section 9.1 is the introduction; Section 9.2 presents a review, sections 9.3 and 9.4
present the proposed tool and its use case diagram, and finally, Section 9.5 is the
conclusion and future work.
9.2 Review

Current research and development mostly goes in the direction of building tools to
automate the software measurement process. Several tools of this type already exist.
For example, Lorenz and Kidd introduce a tool called OOMetric, which
developed as software measurements tool for Smalltalk and VisualAge programs. The
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basis for this tool can be found in [Lorenz, 1994]. Lorenz and Kidd describe
measurements and give advice derived from a number of actual projects that have used
object technology to deliver products. Reiner Dumke and his team [Dumke, 1996]
developed a tool called ObjecTool, which is used for analyzing C++ programs.
Fenelon et al [Fenelon, 1999] have developed a tool support for the estimation of
software quality. El-Emam [El-Emam, 2001c], presents a metrics analyzer tool for the
C++ source code. This analyzer collects its data from C++ code. These data are analyzed
to calculate a set of design metrics. In [Nenonen, 2000], the author presented a tool for
measuring static metrics from UML diagrams. These mentioned tools are highly
specialized in the approaches they implement and the particular phase of the software life
cycle in which they are applicable.
Many of these tools are source code metrics based decision making tools
(language oriented tools). None of the mentioned tools deled with any kind of dynamic
metrics of the software.
Source code metrics are affected by the programming style of the programmer. Th
programming language itself with its structures affects the metrics results. When
calculating the metrics from architectural descriptions like UML, we achieve
independence of languages and human factors [Hitz, 1998].
On the other hand, some tools [Nenonen, 2000] do get a description from
intermediate file by using certain CASE tools; they can be used in the design phase as
well, but they only produce static metrics to describe the model with limited capability,
which is not enough to accurately represent the dynamic behavior of the architecture.
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They even require the software model to be in a specific chosen format, which is not
convenient for popular use.
Our proposed tool is a dynamic metrics based tool, UML based tool, and used
early on in the design phase for the prediction of software architectural element risk.
9.3 Proposed Tool

The implementation and the coding of the tool is presented in details in [Wang,
2003].
To obtain useful quality assurance information early enough for improvement
purposes, we base our quality predictions on measurements and calculations of the highlevel design diagrams obtained from UML artifacts. To automate and implement the risk
assessment methodology we propose an automated UML-based software risk assessment
prototype tool.
The proposed prototype tool is called Architecture-level Risk Assessment Tool
(ARAT), and is used to demonstrate the process of risk assessment. ARAT is built to
implement the risk assessment methodology (presented in chapter 6), by manipulating the
data acquired from domain expert and measures obtained from UML artifacts.
ARAT measures dynamic metrics proposed in [Hassan, 2001] (chapter 4) and
automatically analyzes the quality of the architecture to produce architectural level
software risk assessment [Katerina, 2003]. Figure 9.1 depicts the overall architecture of
ARAT.
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Figure 9.1 Overall architecture of ARAT
Rational Rose is a well established UML modeling tool in software engineering
[Douglass, 2000] To model the software under study we used Rose RT as a modeling
environment. RRT is specifically useful for modeling real time system [ ].
To be able to quantify measurements from the visual UML model, we used RRT
script to convert the UML visual model to readable text format. The script automatically
goes through all the diagrams of the target software UML model. It captures the detailed
information of the visual UML model and stores it in the repository for further analysis
and calculation.
On the top of these information of UML model we use java as a programming
environment with the proposed risk methodology [Katerina, 2003] and severity analysis
process [Hassan, 2003c] to come up with detailed risk assessment of the software model.
For historical review and comparing multiple versions of the design we store all the
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information of the model and the results of risk assessment process on a repository as
shown in figure 9.1.
9.3.1 ARAT Use Case

In this section we will describe the use case diagram of ARAT, which is shown in
Figure 9.2.

Figure 9.2 ARAT Use Case diagram
Collection model information (use case 1)

The implementation of this part of the tool is done using the RRT script with the
UML model under RRT environment. The input of this module is the UML visual model
and the output is the detailed information of the UML model as a text format. Figure 9.3
shows an example of the output for a given input (case study shown in Figure 7.3).
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Figure 9.3 Information captured from use case diagram pacemaker
Retrieve model information (use case 2)

This use case is used for input/output the information to/from the repository. This
information could be about the UML model, dynamic metrics, severity, or risk
assessment.
Estimate dynamic metrics (use case 3)

This part of the tool is the implementation of dynamic metrics presented in
chapter 4. Figure 9.4 shows example of coupling for connectors for pace maker case
study.
Estimate Component/Connector risk factor (use case 4)

This part of the tool used with input from severity assessment (chapter 5), and
component/connector probability of failure (chapter 4) to estimate the risk factor for each
component/connector.
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Figure 9.4 connector coupling for every scenario of pacemaker
Estimate scenario level risk actor (use case 5)

To implement the estimation of scenario level risk factor we use this part of the
tool. The estimation of scenario level risk factor is shown in chapter 6. The detailed
analysis of the scenario level risk factor is presented in [Ajith, 2004]
Estimate system level risk factor (use case 6)

This part of the tool is the implementation of system level risk factor described in
chapter 6. The detailed description and design of ARAT is presented in [Wang, 2003].
Figure 9.5 shows the GUI of the ARAT tool.
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Figure 9.5 is one of the examples of console GUI from the ARAT
9.4 Conclusion

Our proposed architectural risk assessment tool is designed to be utilized during
the early software development phases. We use Rational Rose Real Time (RRT) as a
modeling environment [Rose, 2001] We use Rose Script for collecting the UML model
information from the UML visual model. This tool support of the risk assessment
methodology could help software managers and engineers to control and optimize the
software development process.
The main benefit of the proposed tool is that it enables the automation of early
assessment of system risk at the architectural level and hence makes it possible for the
analyst to identify critical components and connectors early in the software lifecycle.
In summary, the main objectives of this tool are listed below:
1. ARAT could carry on the risk assessment as early as the design phase in the
lifecycle of the software development.
2. By using ARART, we would be able to precisely compute the
component/connector risk factor, scenarios risk factor, use case or system risk
factors.
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3. the manager will be able to determine the distribution of the scenario, use case
or system risk factor over different severity classes.
4. With ARAT, the analyst will be able to identify critical components based on
the risk estimation.
5. ARAT is flexible enough to include more functional modules that will be
developed in the future, like performance analysis module, hazard analysis
module etc.
In the future, we intend to integrate severity assessment module to ARAT to
automate the severity analysis methodology proposed in chapter 5.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion and Future work

Several conclusions emerge from this research. We conclude that this work is a
promising and significant step in meeting our research objectives: to develop risk
assessment methodology based on measurable parameters that could be automatically
collected and analyzed in the early software design phase based on UML artifacts. And to
develop a severity assessment methodology based on UML artifacts. Several other
conclusions are drawn with respect to our aims of the research.
This research presents the architectural-level reliability-based risk assessment
methodology. In this research we propose a methodology for risk assessment based on
the UML specifications such as use cases and sequence diagrams that can be used in the
early phases of software life cycle. The proposed methodology uses dynamic complexity
and dynamic coupling metrics that are obtained from the UML specifications [Hassan,
2001].
The risk assessment methodology presented in this research [Katerina, 2003]
considers both component and connector risk factors. It is used for calculating the risk
factors of various components and connectors and estimating a risk factor of scenarios
use cases and system level. We combine the probability of software architectural element
failure with the severity of that failure to estimate the risk factor of software architectural
element.
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To estimate the probability of software architectural element failure we propose
dynamic metrics (dynamic complexity/dynamic coupling) for the software architectural
element. The proposed metrics could be obtained at early development phases from UML
models.
To estimate the severity of software failure we propose a UML based severity
methodology (chapter 5). This methodology describes a process for estimating severity of
each software architectural element component/connector at the software architectural
level as well as severity of system scenarios [Hassan, 2003]. The process is based on
dynamic UML specifications, taking into account the possibility of component/connector
cost of failures [Hassan, 2003c]. The severity methodology is based on hazard analysis
techniques [Hassan, 2005]. FFA is used as a top down approach based on system
scenarios to identify the system level failures, FMEA is used as a bottom up appraoch
based on the detailed view of the system to identify the possible causes
component/connector failures and FTA correlates the results of FMEA and FFA.
Since the risk assessment methodology is entirely analytical and provides a closed
form solution, it is very suitable for automation. In fact, a prototype of the risk
assessment tool written in JAVA [Wang, 2003] which reads the embedded UML
information from Rational Rose visual model, and calculates the various risk factors has
already been developed.
In summary the proposed methodology is an efficient method to estimate risk
factors on different levels of software design and we could estimate overall system risk
factor. It enables us to estimate scenarios and use cases risk factors which enable us to
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focus on the high-risk scenarios and uses cases even though they may be rarely used and
therefore may not contribute significantly to the overall system risk factor.
Next, we estimate the distribution of the scenarios/use cases/system risk factors over
different severity classes, which allow us to make a list of critical scenarios in each use
case, as well as a list of critical use cases in the system for every severity class. Finally,
we identify a list of critical components and connectors that has high risk values in high
severity classes.
Our future work is focused on generalization of the methodology presented in this
dissertation. Thus, we will extend this methodology to relax the assumption of
independent use cases. We will consider different kinds of dependencies that might be
present in the UML use case diagrams (i.e. considers the various relationships between
the use cases) and the way to derive their risk factors. Another direction of our future
research is the development of performance based risk assessment methodology
[Cortellessa, 2005] and requirement based risk assessment methodology [Appukutty,
2005].
In the future, we could also do the following:

•

Empirically validate the proposed dynamic metrics and their correlation with
design quality attributes,

•

Develop severity assessment module to be integrated with ARAT to automate the
severity analysis methodology proposed in chapter 5,

•

Extend the risk methodology for other kinds of risk (Ex. maintainability risk,
performance risk, requirement risk),
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•

Validate the severity methodology using fault injection experiment using many
case studies.

•

Apply the mitigation action required as a result of risk assessment on a specific
case study (ex. redesign the system) and reassess the risk.

•

Extend the system to handle the risk management not only risk assessment (based
on risk assessment identify and study the alternatives required for this software
product).
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Appendix A
Pace Maker Case Study

The scenarios of the pacemaker are presented in this appendix.
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Figure 1 AAI scenario
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Figure 3 AAT Scenario
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Figures 1-4 show the scenario diagrams for the pace maker case study.
Components and connectors severities are shown in Tables 1,2.

Component severity
Scenario Name RS CD CG AR VT
Programming 0.25 0.25 0.5
AVI

0.5 0.95 0.95

AAI

0.5 0.95

VVI

0.5

AAT

0.5 0.95

0.95

VVT

0.5

0.95

Table 1 components severity for every scenario of the Pace maker

Scenario name

Connector Name

Programming
RS-CD

0.25

RS-CG

0.25

CD-CG

0.25

CG-CD

0.25

CG-AR

AVI

AAI

0.5

0.5

CG-VT

0.5

VT-AR

0.95

AR-VT

0.95

VVI

AAT

VVT

0.5
0.5

0.5

Table 2 connectors severity for every scenario of the Pace maker
Figure 5 shows the risk factor for each component for each scenario of the
pacemaker as shown from the tool.
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Figure 5 the tool demo output for risk of pace maker scenarios
Figure 6 shows the dynamic complexity of each component for every scenario of
the pacemaker.

A-4

Figure 6 Dynamic Complexity of components of pace maker
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Appendix B
HCS Case study Results

According to the expert domain knowledge the probabilities of use case operation
is as follow.
Use case

S_LT

D_LT

MT

S_MT

D_MT

R_B_P

Dua

LT

Monitor

Probability

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.92

Table (1) shows the probabilities of the scenarios of the HCS
Tables 2-9 show the complexity, severity and risk factor of every component for every
scenario.
scenario
component
S_LT
pFMC_MTR1
pFMC_LTR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
appl_command_queueR1
fRITCSR1
sCITCSR1
schedularR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1

complexity severity Risk Factor
0.071428575
0.25
0.017857
0.14285715
0.75
0.107143
0.071428575
0.25
0.017857
0.071428575
0.75
0.053571
0.071428575
0.5
0.035714
0.37714287
0.95
0.358286
0.14285715
0.5
0.071429
0.071428575
0.75
0.053571

Table (2) S_LT Scenario components risk factor
scenario
component
S_MT
pFMC_LTR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
pFMC_MTR1
schedularR1
sCITCSR1
fRITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
appl_command_queueR1

complexity severity Risk Factor
0.071428575
0.25
0.017857
0.071428575
0.25
0.017857
0.14285715
0.75
0.107143
0.14285715
0.5
0.071429
0.35714287
0.95
0.339286
0.071428575
0.5
0.035714
0.071428575
0.75
0.053571
0.071428575
0.75
0.053571

Table (3) S_MT scenario components complexity, severity and risk factor
scenario component
R_B_P sCITCSR1
fRITCSR1
rPCM_LT
pFMC_LTR1
rPCM_MT
pFMC_MTR1

complexity severity Risk Factor
0.2857143
0.95 0.27142859
0.35714287
0.95 0.33928573
0.071428575
0.95 0.067857146
0.071428575
0.95 0.067857146
0.14285715
0.95 0.13571429
0.071428575
0.95 0.067857146

Table (4) R_B_P Scenario components risk factor
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scenario
component
LT
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_LTR1
rPCM_LT
fRITCSR1
appl_command_queueR1
schedularR1

complexity severity Risk Factor
0.18181819
0.95
0.172727
0.27272728
0.5
0.136364
0.09090909
0.75
0.068182
0.18181819
0.5
0.090909
0.27272728
0.95
0.259091
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table (5) LT Scenario components risk factor
scenario
component
D_LT pFMC_MTR1
pFMC_LTR1
fRITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
sCITCSR1
schedularR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
appl_command_queueR1

complexity severity Risk Factor
0.13333334
0.75
0.1
0.06666667
0.25
0.016667
0.06666667
0.5
0.033333
0.06666667
0.75
0.05
0.4
0.95
0.38
0.13333334
0.5
0.066667
0.06666667
0.25
0.016667
0.06666667
0.75
0.05

Table (6) D_LT Scenario components risk factor
scenario
component
D_MT n3_1_Data_AccessR1
appl_command_queueR1
fRITCSR1
pFMC_MTR1
sCITCSR1
schedularR1
pFMC_LTR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1

complexity severity Risk Factor
0.06666667
0.75
0.05
0.06666667
0.75
0.05
0.06666667
0.5
0.033333
0.06666667
0.25
0.016667
0.4
0.95
0.38
0.13333333
0.5
0.066667
0.13333333
0.75
0.1
0.06666667
0.25
0.016667

Table (7) D_MT Scenario components risk factor

scenario
component
MT
fRITCSR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_MTR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
rPC_MT

complexity severity Risk Factor
0.27272728
0.95
0.259091
0.27272728
0.5
0.136364
0.09090909
0.75
0.068182
0.18181819
0.95
0.172727
0.18181819
0.5
0.090909

Table (8) MT Scenario components risk factor

B-2

Figure 1 D_MT scenario
scenario
component
complexity severity Risk Factor
Monitor sCITCSR1
0.25
0.25
0.0625
appl_command_queueR1
0.25
0.95
0.2375
schedularR1
0.25
0.95
0.2375
fRITCSR1
0.25
0.95
0.2375

Table (9) Monitor scenario components risk factor

B-3

Figure 2 Components risk factor for every scenario
Figure 9 shows the 3-D bar graph for risk factor for all components for every
scenario. The components “sCITCSR1” and “fRITCSR1” have high risk in more that one
scenario.
Connector risk factor for every scenario HCS

Tables 10-18 show the connectors coupling, severity and risk factor for every
scenario.
scenario
sender
S_MT
appl_command_queueR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_LTR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_MTR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
schedularR1

receiver
sCITCSR1
appl_command_queueR1
pFMC_LTR1
pFMC_MTR1
sCITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
fRITCSR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1

coupling severity Risk Factor
0.05882353
0.5 0.029411765
0.05882353
0.75 0.04411765
0.05882353
0.95 0.055882353
0.1764706
0.75 0.13235295
0.05882353
0.95 0.055882353
0.1764706
0.75 0.13235295
0.05882353
0.75 0.04411765
0.11764706
0.75 0.0882353
0.11764706
0.75 0.0882353
0.05882353
0.75 0.04411765
0.05882353
0.95 0.055882353

Table (10) S_MT scenario
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scenario
sender
S_LT
schedularR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
appl_command_queueR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_LTR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_MTR1

receiver
sCITCSR1
fRITCSR1
appl_command_queueR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_MTR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_LTR1
sCITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
sCITCSR1

Coupling severity Risk Factor
0.05882353
0.75 0.04411765
0.05882353
0.95 0.055882353
0.05882353
0.5 0.029411765
0.05882353
0.95 0.055882353
0.05882353
0.95 0.055882353
0.1764706
0.95 0.16764706
0.05882353
0.75 0.04411765
0.1764706
0.95 0.16764706
0.11764706
0.75 0.0882353
0.11764706
0.95 0.11176471
0.05882353
0.75 0.04411765

Table (11) S_LT scenario
scenario
sender
Dua
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
pFMC_MTR1
schedularR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_LTR1
sCITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
appl_command_queueR1

receiver
Coupling severity Risk Factor
pFMC_MTR1
0.15
0.95
0.1425
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
0.1
0.75
0.075
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
0.1
0.75
0.075
sCITCSR1
0.05
0.95
0.0475
sCITCSR1
0.1
0.75
0.075
sCITCSR1
0.05
0.75
0.0375
pFMC_LTR1
0.15
0.75 0.112500004
fRITCSR1
0.05
0.5
0.025
sCITCSR1
0.1
0.95
0.095
appl_command_queueR1
0.05
0.75
0.0375
sCITCSR1
0.05
0.95
0.0475
sCITCSR1
0.05
0.75
0.0375

Table (12) Dua scenario
scenario
sender
D_LT
schedularR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_MTR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
appl_command_queueR1
pFMC_LTR1
sCITCSR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1

receiver
Coupling severity Risk Factor
sCITCSR1
0.0625
0.75
0.046875
fRITCSR1
0.0625
0.75
0.046875
appl_command_queueR1
0.0625
0.75
0.046875
sCITCSR1
0.125
0.75
0.09375
pFMC_LTR1
0.0625
0.75
0.046875
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
0.125
0.95
0.11875
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
0.125
0.95
0.11875
sCITCSR1
0.0625
0.95
0.059375
sCITCSR1
0.0625
0.75
0.046875
pFMC_MTR1
0.1875
0.75
0.140625
sCITCSR1
0.0625
0.75
0.046875

Table (13) D_LT scenario
scenario
sender
receiver
Monitor schedularR1 sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1 fRITCSR1
sCITCSR1 appl_command_queueR1

Coupling severity Risk Factor
0.33333334
0.75
0.25
0.33333334
0.95 0.31666666
0.33333334
0.75
0.25

Table (14) Monitor scenario
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scenario
sender
LT
fRITCSR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
fRITCSR1
pFMC_LTR1
fRITCSR1

receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor
sCITCSR1
0.3
0.95
0.285
fRITCSR1
0.1
0.75
0.075
pFMC_LTR1
0.1
0.75
0.075
fRITCSR1
0.3
0.75 0.22500001
rPCM_LT
0.2
0.75
0.15

Table (15) LT scenario
scenario
sender
MT
fRITCSR1
fRITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
pFMC_MTR1
fRITCSR1

receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor
sCITCSR1
0.3
0.75 0.22500001
pFMC_MTR1
0.1
0.75
0.075
fRITCSR1
0.1
0.95
0.095
fRITCSR1
0.3
0.95
0.285
rPC_MT
0.2
0.75
0.15

Table (16) MT scenario
scenario
sender
R_B_P pFMC_LTR1
fRITCSR1
fRITCSR1
pFMC_MTR1
fRITCSR1
fRITCSR1
fRITCSR1

receiver
fRITCSR1
pFMC_LTR1
pFMC_MTR1
fRITCSR1
sCITCSR1
rPCM_LT
rPCM_MT

Coupling severity Risk Factor
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.06666667
0.95 0.06333333
0.06666667
0.75 0.050000004
0.2
0.95
0.19
0.26666668
0.75 0.20000002
0.06666667
0.75 0.050000004
0.13333334
0.75 0.10000001

Table (17) R_B_P scenario
scenario
sender
D_MT
sCITCSR1
schedularR1
sCITCSR1
appl_command_queueR1
sCITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
sCITCSR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_LTR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_MTR1

receiver
pFMC_LTR1
sCITCSR1
n3_1_Data_AccessR1
sCITCSR1
pFMC_MTR1
sCITCSR1
appl_command_queueR1
fRITCSR1
sCITCSR1
n3_2_Data_AccessR1
sCITCSR1

Coupling severity Risk Factor
0.1875
0.75
0.140625
0.0625
0.95
0.059375
0.125
0.75
0.09375
0.0625
0.95
0.059375
0.0625
0.75
0.046875
0.0625
0.75
0.046875
0.0625
0.75
0.046875
0.0625
0.75
0.046875
0.125
0.75
0.09375
0.125
0.75
0.09375
0.0625
0.75
0.046875

Table (18) D_MT scenario
Applying the severity methodology presented in chapter 5 to this case study we
estimate the severity of every component and connector for every scenario as shown in
Table 19, Table 20.
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Component name

pMR1
pLR1
n2R1
aR1
fR1
sR1
SchR1
n1R1
rLT
rMT

S_LT
0.25
0.75
0.25
0.75
0.5
0.95
0.5
0.75
0
0

D_LT
0.75
0.25
0.75
0.75
0.5
0.95
0.5
0.25
0
0

MT
0.75
0
0.95
0
0.95
0.5
0
0
0
0.5

LT
0
0.75
0
0
0.95
0.5
0
0.95
0.5
0

Scenario name
S_MT
D_MT
0.75
0.25
00.25
0.75
0.75
0.25
0.75
0.75
0.5
0.5
0.95
0.95
0.5
0.5
0.25
0.75
0
0
0
0

Dua
0.75
0.75
0.5
0.95
0.75
0.95
0.25
0.75
0
0

Monitor
0
0
0
0.95
0.95
0.25
0.95
0
0
0

R_B_P
0.95
0.95
0
0
0.95
0.95
0
0
0.95
0.95

Connector name

Table (19) Component severity for every scenario

pMR1-sR1
pLR1-sR1
n2R1-sR1
aR1-sR1
fR1-sR1
sR1-aR1
SchR1-sR1
n1R1-sR1
rLT
rMT
sR1-pLR1
sR1-pMR1
sR1-n2R1
sR1-n1R1
sR1-fR1
n1R1-fR1
fR1-pLR1
pLR1-fR1
fR1-rLT
fR1-pMR1
pMR1-fR1
fR1-rMT
n2R1-fR1

S_LT
0.75
0.75
0.95
0.75
0
0.5
0.75
0
0
0
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

D_LT
0.75
0.75
0
0.95
0
0.75
0.75
0.75
0
0
0.75
0.75
0.95
0.95
0.75
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

MT
0
0
0
0
0.75
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.75
0.95
0.75
0.75

LT
0
0
0
0
0.95
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0
0
0
0

Scenario name
S_MT
D_MT
0.75
0.75
0.95
0.75
0
0.75
0.5
0.95
0
0
0.75
0.75
0.95
0.75
0.75
0
0
0
0
0
0.95
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Dua
0.75
0.95
0.95
0.75
0
0.75
0.75
0.95
0
0
0.75
0.95
0.75
0.75
0.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Monitor
0
0
0
0
0
0.75
0.75
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.95
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

R_B_P
0
0
0
0
0.75
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.95
0.5
0.75
0.75
0.95
0.75
0

Table (20) Connector severity for every scenario
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